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1Abstract
In 1995, the Social Security Administration started sending out the annual Social
Security Statement. It contains information about the worker’s estimated beneﬁts
at the ages 62, 65, and 70. We use this unique natural experiment to analyze the
retirement and claiming decision making. First, we ﬁnd that, despite the previ-
ous availability of information, the Statement has a signiﬁcant impact on workers’
knowledge about their beneﬁts. These ﬁndings are consistent with a model where
workers need to gather costly information in order to improve their retirement deci-
sion. Second, we use this exogenous variation in knowledge to analyze the optimality
of workers’ decisions. We do not ﬁnd an overall improvement in workers’ retirement
behavior, but there are some changes among particular groups. Workers aged 62
and 65 become less sensitive to Social Security Incentives. Age 62 and 65 are the two
ages at which the retirement beneﬁts are reported in the Statement, which suggests
that some workers may use them as focal points. Additionally, we ﬁnd evidence that
before the Statement was introduced uninformed workers, who are more likely to
be low–educated and black, made, on average, worse retirement decisions, and that
workers with a dependent spouse usually disregarded their own spouse’s beneﬁts
in their calculations. The information contained in the Statement appears to have
helped both groups, though with the important exception of black workers.
Keywords: social security statements, retirement expectations, retirement behavior,
social security incentives
JEL classiﬁcation codes: H55, J261 Introduction
Social Security is the largest expenditure program in the United States. The 70-year-old
system provides more than half of the income for two thirds of the elderly population.
For 34 percent of them, Social Security beneﬁts represent 90 percent of their income (Fast
Facts & Figures About Social Security 2004). Due to demographic changes, the Social
Security system faces a ﬁscal imbalance and is in urgent need of reform. This is clearly
acknowledged by the Social Security Administration (SSA) in the Statement that is sent
yearly to all workers:
“Your estimated beneﬁts are based on current law. Congress has made
changes to the law in the past and can do so at any time. The law governing
beneﬁt amounts may change because, by 2042, the payroll taxes collected will
be enough to pay only about 73 percent of scheduled beneﬁts.”
While reforms are necessary, the nature of these reforms is a subject of controversy.
In order to evaluate diﬀerent proposals, it is critical to understand how people make their
retirement decisions.
Standard economic theory assumes that agents base their retirement decisions on
forward-looking variables, such as the present discounted value of the agents’ Social Se-
curity beneﬁts (the income eﬀect) and its changes due to working an additional year (the
substitution eﬀect). Hurd (1990) and Krueger and Meyer (2002) provide a comprehensive
survey of studies that have tried to measure these eﬀects.
The income eﬀect due to an increase in the present discounted value of Social Security
beneﬁts, called the Social Security wealth (SSW) should induce early retirement. Numer-
ous empirical studies have found this eﬀect. There is no consensus, however, on the size of
the eﬀect, in other words on how much of the trend towards lower labor force participation
is attributable to the expanding Social Security system and how much to changes in pref-
erences for leisure. The main empirical issue is that Social Security is a federal program,
and thus any cross-sectional variation in beneﬁts arises from cross-sectional variation in
3life-time earnings, marital status, and number of dependents, and all these factors may,
as well, have independent eﬀects on labor supply decisions (Krueger and Meyer 2002).1
Postponing retirement by one year can generate considerable changes in SSW (the
SSW accrual). Positive accruals generate an incentive to work, though the size of this
eﬀect, the substitution eﬀect, has been disputed as well. There are two pronounced
retirement rate spikes: at the early retirement age (ERA) and at the normal retirement
age (NRA). Around 60 percent of people claim their Social Security beneﬁts at the age
of 62, and among those who do not claim before age 65, 80 percent claim at age 65.
Some factors can partially explain this clustering: large disutility from work and/or a
large discount rate (ERA spike) and discontinuities in the adjustment rates (NRA spike).
However, as pointed out by Panis, Hurd, Loughran, Zissimopoulos, Haider and St.Clair
(2002) and Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1996), most structural models are unable to
account for the size of these spikes. One plausible explanation for the existence of spikes
is provided by Phelan and Rust (1997), who attribute part of the 62-spike to liquidity
constraints and part of the 65-spike to lock-in eﬀects due to Medicare when workers lack
alternative health insurance in retirement.
Their explanation is at odds, however, with the evidence from the 1961 change in the
early retirement age from 65 to 62. While the ERA has changed suddenly, the spike in
retirement has moved very slowly (over 30 years, Burtless 1999). Based on this evidence,
Axtell and Epstein (1999) suggest that spikes may not be entirely the product of rational
decision making but resemble some herd behavior. Additional support for a behavioral
explanation of the spikes is provided by the recent increase in the NRA suggested by
the 1983 Greenspan Commission. Mastrobuoni (2006) shows that the entire 65-spike
at which the workers claim their Social Security beneﬁts moved together with NRA.
This contradicts the Medicare explanation as the Medicare eligibility at age 65 remained
unchanged.2
1Krueger and Pischke (1992) try to overcome this problem using “double-indexing” for the “notch-
generation,” a generation that faced sudden great reductions in SSW. The authors note that labor force
participation continued falling during this time, casting doubt on previously estimated income eﬀects.
2The Social Security Statement contains the advice that, “even if you do not retire at age 65, be sure
to contact Social Security three months before your 65th birthday to enroll in Medicare.”
4Economic models of retirement implicitly assume that workers know their future bene-
ﬁts as a function of their retirement age and are able to compare future streams of beneﬁts.
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that these are strong assumptions. When asked,
only around 50 percent provide an estimate of their expected Social Security beneﬁts
(Bernheim and Levin 1989, Gustman and Steinmeier 2001).3 Gustman and Steinmeier
show that less than 30 percent of respondents are able to estimate their future beneﬁts to
within about $1,500 per year. Moreover, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) show that ﬁnancial
illiteracy is widespread among older Americans. Only half of the age 50+ respondents can
correctly answer two simple questions regarding interest compounding and inﬂation. Is it
then reasonable to assume those same respondents are able to compute their retirement
incentives, which typically involve relatively complex calculations?
Despite very little knowledge about retirement incentives, the fact that people seem
to respond to incentives when making their retirement decisions has been called by Chan
and Stevens (2003) an “important empirical puzzle in the retirement literature.”
Gustman and Steinmeier try to test the robustness of retirement models when a mea-
sure of knowledge about beneﬁts is added to the retirement regression. They ﬁnd that
knowledge does not aﬀect workers’ responsiveness to incentives. Chan and Stevens go
one step further and analyze how the interaction of knowledge and accruals aﬀects work-
ers’ decisions. The authors ﬁnd that the responsiveness to pension incentives is entirely
driven by the 20 percent of workers who perceive them correctly.4 The validity of us-
ing measures of knowledge in the regressions, however, is questionable as knowledge is
endogenous: workers gather information when they approach their expected retirement
age.
3In our data that focuses on workers aged 55 and above the 2/3 of workers are able to provide an
estimate.
4They do not ﬁnd any link between knowledge and Social Security incentives, which they consider a
result of data limitations. The ﬁrst limitation is that they can measure if workers correctly perceive their
Social Security beneﬁts, but not if they correctly perceive their Social Security accruals. The second
limitation is that the match between the Health and Retirement Survey and the administrative records
is available only up to the 1992 survey year, and is likely to introduce measurement error in the beneﬁt
calculations for the subsequent years.
5We make use of a unique natural experiment to shed light on these issues: In 1995, the
Social Security Administration started sending out the annual Social Security Statement.
The Statement is a concise, easy-to-read personal record of past earnings and a summary
of the estimated beneﬁts for the worker and his or her family as a function of his or
her retirement age. The Statement has been sent out in phases, starting with workers
who were 60 years and older. In later years it has been sent according to the following
(year,age) combinations: (1996, 58+), (1997, 53+), (1998, 47+), (1999, 44+), (2000,
25+).
The introduction of the Statement provides an exogenous source of variation in the
information about Social Security beneﬁts. This change is used to analyze workers’ retire-
ment and claiming decisions. First, we model how workers gather information about their
Social Security beneﬁts. The empirical evidence is consistent with a model of retirement
where information is costly. The Statement allows us to look at the eﬀect of moving from a
system in which information is freely available, but the worker has to show some initiative
and either call the SSA or learn the Social Security beneﬁt rules to know about the Social
Security incentives he or she faces, to a system where the cost of gathering information
is basically zero. We show that these two systems produce signiﬁcantly diﬀerent levels of
knowledge.5 We identify workers who know little or nothing about their future Social Se-
curity beneﬁts before they receive the Statement and ﬁnd that they beneﬁt the most from
the information contained in the Statement. We ﬁnd that, for these workers, the eﬀect of
the Statement on knowledge is strong even when they are close to their retirement date.
Respondents from the Health and Retirement survey are less likely to say that they don’t
know their beneﬁts and their expected beneﬁts are closer to the actual beneﬁts that they
end up getting in later waves. Uninformed workers, though, are a very selective sample
of the population. In order to value the information, workers need to be able to use the
5Duﬂo and Saez (2003) is similar in spirit to our analysis in that it also deals with the endogeneity
problem of information. The authors use a randomized experiment to study the role of information in
the employees’ decisions to enroll in a Tax Deferred Account retirement plan. They conclude that “the
important decision about how much to save for retirement can be aﬀected by small shocks such as a very
small ﬁnancial reward and/or the inﬂuence of peers, and thus does not seem to be the consequence of an
elaborate decision process.”
6information and need to be free to choose their retirement age. It is known that workers
who face health problems or are liquidity constraints tend to retire as soon as possible.
Consistent with this, we ﬁnd that wealthier and healthier workers are signiﬁcantly more
likely to get informed. A more puzzling ﬁnding is that even after controlling for labor
market experience, occupation, wealth, and health, black workers and workers with low
levels of education are signiﬁcantly less likely to know their beneﬁts. One possible expla-
nation for this persistent gap is that these workers are also more likely to be ﬁnancially
illiterate (Lusardi and Mitchell 2006).
Later, we measure how the additional information about Social Security incentives af-
fects retirement and claiming behavior. We look at changes in workers’ expectations about
their claiming age, and we ﬁnd only limited evidence that receiving the ﬁrst Statement
generally induces some workers to update their expectations.
Then, we use the exogenous variation in information to test whether retirement and
claiming decisions become more sensitive to Social Security incentives. Workers who
are not well informed before receiving the Statement, namely blacks and low educated
workers, are also the ones for whom Social Security accruals play the smallest role in
claiming decisions. But this is not necessarily inconsistent with the theory, because those
workers are also more likely to be liquidity constraint and in bad health.
The introduction of the Statement, instead, generates mixed results. Low educated
workers show a small and insigniﬁcant increase in the responsiveness to the Social Security
incentives, but black workers show a large and signiﬁcant reduction. This ﬁnding and two
other ﬁndings are puzzling, namely that: 1) workers whose spouse is eligible to receive
dependent beneﬁts become more likely to take these additional beneﬁts into consideration
when deciding about retirement (this may be due to the lack of information about the
existence of spouse’s and survivor’s beneﬁts, an additional information contained in the
Statement); 2) workers aged 62 and 65 become less sensitive to Social Security Incentives
(age 62 and 65 are the two ages at which the retirement beneﬁts are reported in the
statement. This is puzzling and suggests that some people retiring at 62 and 65 make
this decision based on simple rules of thumb and not Social Security incentives).
7Summing up, it seems that for some groups, namely low–educated workers the lack of
knowledge is the product of a maximization process, while for others, mostly blacks, lack
of knowledge is more diﬃcult to be justiﬁed.
2 Data
We use the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to evaluate how the Statement aﬀects
workers’ knowledge about their future beneﬁts, and to evaluate what determines whether
workers are informed even before receiving the Statement. Later we use the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to evaluate the eﬀect of the Statement on
retirement decisions.
The HRS is a longitudinal, biennial, nationally representative survey of older Amer-
icans. We use waves 1 to 6 (1992–2002), and restrict the analysis to workers older than
age 55 who are not receiving Social Security disability beneﬁts. We also use a special
module added to the 2004 survey to analyze ﬁnancial literacy. To measure the actual ef-
fect on retirement decisions, we use the 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1996 SIPP surveys matched
with information on beneﬁt receipt and earnings histories from the Social Security Ad-
ministration’s administrative records. Since workers who reach the early retirement age
of 62 after the 1983 Social Security amendments face conceptually similar beneﬁt rules
and since Statements were introduced in 1995, we restrict our analysis to workers born
after 1922. Seventy percent of married women are eligible for spousal beneﬁts that exceed
their own beneﬁts; therefore, when analyzing retirement behavior, we focus the analysis
on male workers. The main advantage of using the SIPP data is that information on
earnings is available up to 2003; that is, the data cover the period after the introduction
of the Statement. In the HRS, on the other hand, only the ﬁrst wave (1992) is matched
to administrative records. While it would be possible to use the survey information for
the years after 1992, it is only available every two years. Another main advantage of the
SIPP over the HRS is that the sample size is ﬁve times larger, which allows us to better
control for observed heterogeneity.
8After restricting the sample to male workers born between 1922 and 1940, the SIPP
data contain around 14,000 observations. Since we cannot control for health status workers
who at any time claim for disability beneﬁts are excluded from the sample.6 Workers are
matched with their spouses’ information. Two percent of male workers have expected
beneﬁts that are smaller than half of the beneﬁts of their spouse. These workers are
excluded from the analysis since they are better oﬀ by claiming for their spouses’ beneﬁts,
and are unlikely to respond to changes in their own SSW.
Using cross-sectional information from the SIPP data, we construct a panel that ranges
from age 55 to either age 72 or the year 2003. Since information from the SIPP survey
is used for both years before and years after the survey, there is a potential measurement
error problem. While the error is likely to be small for characteristics that change little
over time (gender, marital status, education, wealth), there are time-varying factors that
have been shown to inﬂuence retirement decisions. There are two important factors that
are time-varying, but that we cannot control for: health status and private pensions.
Previous studies have found that the elasticity of retirement with respect to Social Secu-
rity incentives is robust to the exclusion of both health status (Panis, Hurd, Loughran,
Zissimopoulos, Haider and St.Clair 2002) and private pensions (Coile and Gruber 2001).
Nevertheless, we control for whether the worker is covered or receives a private pension,
and whether he has health insurance. Table 13 in the Appendix shows the summary
statistics for the main SIPP sample used later in the regressions.
3 The Social Security Statement
The introduction of the Statements was phased in starting in 1995. The SSA was required
to mail the annual Statement—then named the Personal Earnings and Beneﬁt Estimate
Statement—to all workers age 60 and older.7 Younger workers have been added to the
recipient list in subsequent years, and since 2000 almost all workers not claiming beneﬁts
6Some further deletions are made mostly for reasons of miscellaneous data inconsistencies.
7In the Appendix we provide a sample of the Social Security Statement. Earlier versions of the
Statement can be found in reports by the GAO, although they changed little over time.
9receive the Statement. Workers usually receive their Statement one month before their
birthdays.8 In fact, this seems to be a good timing since 65 percent of all workers claim
immediately after their birthdays (15 percent of the claims occur in January and the
remaining workers tend to claim uniformly across the year).
The main purpose of the Statement is to inform the public about beneﬁts under
SSA programs, to aid in ﬁnancial planning, and to ensure the worker’s earnings records
are complete and accurate. The Statement contains expected Social Security beneﬁts
at the early (62), the normal (usually 65, though increasing since 2003), and the late
(70) retirement age as well as the worker’s entire earnings history. The Statement also
informs workers about spouse’s beneﬁts, survivors’ beneﬁts, and disability beneﬁts. The
Statement does not report the SSW. Later, we evaluate how this additional information
aﬀects workers’ retirement behavior assuming that workers are able to compute their
SSW.
Beside the Government Accountability Oﬃce (GAO) that has tried to evaluate their
understandability, economists have not paid much attention to the introduction of the
Statements.9 This has prompted Jackson (2005) to conclude that: “Given the importance
of Social Security beneﬁts to so many Americans, it is surprising how little academic
attention has been given to the content and implications of Social Security beneﬁts” and
“..., what is clear is that the Social Security Statement is one of the most important
communication that the federal government sends out to the general public each year,
and as such the document deserves much more attention from public oﬃcial and academic
writers than it has received to date.”
According to the GAO reports the overall public reaction to receiving an unsolicited
Statement has been favorable. The reports cite a nationally representative survey in which
(as predicted by Bernheim, 1987) “the majority of the respondents indicated they were
glad to receive their Statements and 95 percent of them said the information provided
was helpful to their families.” The April 2005 report ﬁnds that 66 percent of workers
8In 2000 the SSA started sending the Statement three months before the worker’s birthday.
9See GAO/T-HEHS-96-210, GAO/HEHS-97-19, GAO/HEHS-98-228, GAO/T-HEHS-00-101, GAO-
05-192 on www.gao.gov
10remember receiving a Statement (unfortunately they do not provide this number by age
groups), and that 90 percent of those who remember receiving a Statement say that they
remember the amount of estimated Social Security beneﬁts. The results of a Gallup sur-
vey, undertaken at the request of the SSA, revealed that individuals who had received
a Statement had a signiﬁcantly increased basic understanding of Social Security, and an
increased understanding of some important basic features of Social Security: the amount
of Social Security beneﬁts depends on how much people earned; Social Security pays
beneﬁts to workers who become disabled; Social Security provides beneﬁts to dependents
of workers who die.10 According to the 2004 Retirement Conﬁdence Survey, 80 percent
of workers use retirement beneﬁt Statements (not necessarily only Social Security State-
ments) and 20 percent ﬁnd them the most helpful tool in retirement and claiming decision
making (Helman and Paladino 2004). Jackson analyzes the content of the Social Security
Statement, and reports how because of various cognitive biases workers may misinterpret
the value of their beneﬁts. He then suggests that including the present discounted value
of Social Security beneﬁts may facilitate the comparison with other sources of income and
minimize labor market distortions.
4 Workers’ knowledge about their beneﬁts and the
Statement
In all six available waves of the HRS (1992–2002), workers are asked about their expected
retirement age and their expected Social Security beneﬁts. Upon receiving the Statement,
workers should be less likely to answer that they do not know the beneﬁt amount they
expect to receive once they retire. Also, for workers who provide an estimate, we expect
the forecast error, that is the diﬀerence between the expected Social Security beneﬁts and
the actual beneﬁts, to be smaller.11
10See http://www.ssa.gov/pressoﬃce/Statementfact.html.
11Because of the panel structure of the survey, we can compare these expectations with the reported
actual beneﬁts received in later waves. Although later on in the analysis we focus on male workers, here,
in order to gain precision, we use both the male and the female samples. Using only the male sample
does not substantially alter any of the results.
11It is important to note that workers have always had the option to ask the SSA to
compute their expected beneﬁts (it would usually take 4 to 6 weeks to receive an estimate).
According to the HRS around 50 percent of the respondents contacts the SSA by age 62.
Given the complexity of the beneﬁt formula this it isn’t too surprising. The Statement is
likely to provide new information mainly to those who have not contacted the SSA. We can
think of them as the treatment group that actually receives a treatment. Since receiving
a Statement inﬂuences the probability of contacting the SSA, we need to correct for this
endogeneity if we want to measure the eﬀect of Statement on those workers who wouldn’t
have contacted the SSA.12 Fortunately it is possible to correct for this endogeneity bias
using pre–Statement information on who contacted the SSA.
Because of this selection the group that contacts the SSA is not a random sample, and
so it is useful to formalize what inﬂuences the decision to contact the SSA.
4.1 Modeling the optimal time for getting informed
A worker will acquire new information about his retirement beneﬁts when, based on his
prior f(b) over the whole distribution of his retirement beneﬁts (which are function of
the retirement age b = (b62,...,b70)) he believes that the expected gains of information
outweigh the cost of information. Retirement aﬀects utility through its consequences on





U[R(b)]f(b)db > c. (1)
Intuitively information matters when better knowledge about the beneﬁts can inﬂu-
ence the retirement decision, in other words, when variation in beneﬁt patterns generate
variations in utility U[R(b)]. If, for example, the prior is such that the worker strongly
believes that it is optimal to retire as soon as possible, it might not be optimal for him
12The 1992 and 1994 waves of the HRS contain information about whether the respondent contacted
the SSA to calculate his beneﬁts (in the 2000 wave only a subset of around 200 people were asked this
question). The exact formulation of the question is: Have you ever had the Social Security Administration
calculate what your Social Security retirement beneﬁt will be?”
12to collect additional information. Factors that can generate such a boundary solution
are high discount rates, high disutility from work (health issues), high mortality, and low
risk aversion. Notice that we are implicitly assuming that workers are able to evaluate
their retirement incentives (complicated functions of their beneﬁts). Financially illiterate
workers, unable to compute those incentives, might also choose not to get informed.
The main eﬀect of the Statement is to considerably reduces c, which should help
workers to make better retirement choices. But if workers select into the unknowledgeable
state changes in retirement behavior are expected to be lower than in a situation where
knowledge were randomly assigned. Before analyzing the eﬀect of the Statement it is
therefore important to analyze the selection issue.
Column (1) in Table 1 shows that, apart from age (multiplied by 1/2 for a reason
that will be clear shortly), the two strongest predictors for contacting the SSA are the
level of education and race. Both, having less than a high school degree and being black,
reduce the probability of contacting the SSA by around 15 percentage points. Consistent
with the theory wealthier workers, therefore workers that are less likely to be liquidity
constraint, are more likely to contact the SSA (column 2). The eﬀects are very large.
Compared to workers that are in the ﬁrst wealth quartile, workers with wealth above the
median are 15 percentage points more likely to contact the SSA. Healthy workers are,
compared to workers in fair and poor health, more likely to contact the SSA. Health and
wealth do also capture around 30 percent of the diﬀerences that in the ﬁrst column were
attributed to race and education.
In column (3) we additionally control for the subjective life–expectancy and for labor
market experience.13 While more experienced workers are signiﬁcantly more likely to
contact the SSA, the coeﬃcient on the subjective life-expectancy is not signiﬁcant. Since
the SSA’s actuarial adjustments for postponing retirement are based on the average life-
expectancy workers with a low subjective life–expectancy should be less likely to get
informed if they know that they should follow the simple rule of retiring and claiming
13The subjective life–expectancy is measured as the self-reported probability of surviving age 75 divided
by the implied probability from the Vital Statistics life tables that someone of the respondent’s age and
gender will live to be 75.
13the beneﬁts as soon as possible. On the other hand, workers with a high life–expectancy
should do the opposite, claim as late as possible (70). Checking for non-linearities does
reveal that workers in the ﬁrst and the last quartile of the distribution of subjective
life–expectancy are less likely to get informed, but the eﬀects are not signiﬁcant.14
Around 35 percent of workers age 65 receive a private pension. The incentives of get-
ting informed might diﬀer by whether workers receive a pension or participate in a deﬁned
beneﬁt or deﬁned contribution plan, both because pension change the liquidity constraint
and because pensions change the overall retirement incentives. When we control for these
factors, we indeed ﬁnd that workers who already receive a pension are signiﬁcantly more
likely to have contacted the SSA.15 Participating in a pension plan does not signiﬁcantly
change the probability of contacting the SSA, even when we focus on those who do not
yet receive a pension income. Do to data limitation we were unable to test whether the
relative importance of pension beneﬁts to Social Security beneﬁts matters. Controlling
for private pensions does not reduce the eﬀects of race and education.
In column (5) we control for the respondents ﬁnancial planning time horizon, informa-
tion available from the HRS’s ﬁrst wave (no information on pensions). How far in advance
workers are planning is certainly related to their time preference. Consistent with this we
ﬁnd that the longer the planning time horizon the more likely it is workers contact the
SSA. It is important to notice that even after controlling for health, wealth, mortality,
and proxies of time preference workers without a high school degree and black workers
are 10 percentage points less likely to contact the SSA. In the last column we addition-
ally control for occupation ﬁxed eﬀects. While this reduces by another 30 percent the
diﬀerences across levels of education, the coeﬃcient on race drops by only 1 percentage
point.
Summing up, workers who didn’t contact the SSA before the introduction of the
Statement tend to be younger, with lower levels of education, single, black, in poor health,
poor, with fewer labor market experience, and less likely to plan many years in advance.
14Results available upon request.
15The sample size is lower because the information on whether the respondent receives a pension isn’t
available in the ﬁrst wave.
14Table 1: Linear probability model of contacting the SSA.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age × 1/2 8.32 8.06 7.55 7.08 7.97 8.22
(0.54)** (0.54)** (0.57)** (0.85)** (0.78)** (0.81)**
Female -1.54 -1.09 2.86 8.28 1.35 0.52
(1.49) (1.47) (1.73) (2.43)** (2.29) (2.64)
Below high school -14.87 -10.53 -9.03 -9.31 -8.98 -6.26
(1.71)** (1.75)** (1.88)** (2.74)** (2.36)** (2.52)*
Some college 6.02 5.18 4.90 5.68 3.25 0.87
(2.11)** (2.09)* (2.15)* (2.87)* (2.78) (2.91)
College 10.29 7.26 8.20 9.09 7.44 5.17
(2.14)** (2.20)** (2.26)** (2.99)** (2.80)** (3.32)
Single -7.55 -3.14 -4.20 -7.03 -4.15 -2.89
(1.61)** (1.67) (1.78)* (2.38)** (2.32) (2.39)
Black -13.87 -10.60 -10.31 -13.24 -10.06 -9.16
(1.74)** (1.75)** (1.93)** (2.75)** (2.37)** (2.49)**
Self–r. health: very good -0.63 -1.32 -1.02 -0.83 -1.05
(1.87) (1.92) (2.80) (2.61) (2.69)
good -1.42 -2.17 1.07 -2.56 -2.17
(1.93) (2.00) (2.92) (2.67) (2.74)
fair -5.05 -4.11 -2.50 -3.89 -3.90
(2.29)* (2.51) (3.95) (3.43) (3.55)
poor -6.66 -5.11 -2.00 -8.13 -9.23
(2.94)* (3.60) (8.09) (5.03) (5.13)
Wealth percentiles: 25-50 6.48 5.61 8.84 4.25 3.69
(1.79)** (1.94)** (2.93)** (2.59) (2.71)
50-75 15.70 14.56 13.75 12.38 11.43
(2.04)** (2.17)** (3.14)** (2.89)** (3.02)**
75-100 16.72 15.64 11.62 16.63 16.39
(2.34)** (2.48)** (3.39)** (3.29)** (3.44)**
Subjective P75 -2.40 0.44 -5.10 -4.64
(1.92) (2.87) (2.56)* (2.65)
Experience 0.43 0.48 0.35 0.32
(0.07)** (0.12)** (0.09)** (0.10)**
Pension on current job 2.38
(2.63)
Deﬁned beneﬁt plan 1.11
(2.77)
Receives a pension 12.42
(3.51)**




few years -7.78 -6.89
(3.59)* (3.69)
5-10 years -5.26 -4.96
(3.68) (3.77)
Occupation dummies no no no no yes
Observations 5466 5466 4990 2018 2346 2190
R-squared 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.18
Notes: Clustered (by individual) standard errors in parentheses. Sample: HRS 1992-1994, age 55-65.
The excluded categories are workers with a high school (HS) degree, in excellent health, with net wealth
in the ﬁrst quartile, and a ﬁnancial time horizon of more than 10 years. The subjective probability of
surviving until age 75, P75, is divided by the implied probability from the Vital Statistics life tables that
someone of the respondent’s age and gender will live to be 75.
15Next we show that these workers are more likely to improve their knowledge about their
beneﬁts upon receiving a Statement, which is consistent with the idea that information
is costly.
4.2 The eﬀect of the Statement on workers’ knowledge about
retirement beneﬁts
Column (1) in Table 2 shows the eﬀect of the Statement on the probability of reporting
Social Security beneﬁts,16 estimated using a linear probability model. We control for
age, age squared, year, gender, level of education, marital status, race, and labor market
experience (number of years with positive earnings). When we control for a quadratic term
of age and a linear term for years the introduction of the Statement reduces the probability
of not reporting an estimate by 5 percentage points. Controlling for age and year ﬁxed
eﬀects (column 2) doesn’t alter the eﬀects. This 16 percent drop in the probability of
being uniformed can be interpreted as an average treatment eﬀect. Being black and not
having a high school degree are both very strong predictors for not knowing the future
amount of the beneﬁts. Controlling for health and wealth does not alter this results, and
the reason is that controlling for age and time the introduction of the Statement tends to
be orthogonal to the other variables.
In order to evaluate the eﬀect of the Statement on workers who didn’t contact the SSA
before receiving the Statement we need to control for the fact that some workers would
have shown an improvement even without the Statement (they would have contacted the
SSA). Deﬁne the event “contacting SSA” as C ∈ {0,1} and “not being able to provide an
estimate” as N ∈ {0,1}. We need to estimate the improvement in Pr(N = 1) that would
have happened independently of the Statement T ∈ {0,1}: Pr(Nt = 1|Ct−2 = 0,T =
0) − Pr(Nt−2 = 1|Ct−2 = 0,T = 0). Having in mind that we are always conditioning
on T = 0, by the law of total probability: Pr(Nt = 1|Ct−2 = 0) = Pr(Nt = 1|Ct =
0)Pr(Ct = 0|Ct−2 = 0) + Pr(Nt = 1|Ct = 1)Pr(Ct = 1|Ct−2 = 0). One way to estimate
16The dependent variable is equal to one when workers respond that they “don’t know” their Social
Security beneﬁts. The very few workers who refuse to respond are not included in the regressions.
16Table 2: Linear probability (in percent) model of being unable to provide a
beneﬁt estimate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Does not report and expected Social Security beneﬁt amount
Post–Statement -5.37 -5.21 -5.13 0.28 -2.14 -2.18
(1.26)** (1.93)** (1.93)** (1.51) (2.17) (2.17)
No SSA contact 29.79 30.08 29.59
(1.65)** (1.65)** (1.65)**
Post× no SSA c. -10.51 -10.90 -11.10
(1.86)** (1.86)** (1.86)**
Female 4.69 4.66 4.72 6.52 6.62 6.88
(1.08)** (1.08)** (1.08)** (1.30)** (1.31)** (1.30)**
Below high school 9.43 9.48 7.61 7.84 7.86 6.52
(1.37)** (1.37)** (1.39)** (1.62)** (1.62)** (1.64)**
Some college -1.81 -1.80 -1.48 -0.01 0.05 0.22
(1.28) (1.28) (1.28) (1.49) (1.49) (1.50)
College -1.74 -1.78 -0.70 1.39 1.39 1.96
(1.30) (1.30) (1.33) (1.50) (1.50) (1.52)
Single 3.93 3.89 2.66 2.37 2.26 1.14
(1.03)** (1.02)** (1.05)* (1.27) (1.27) (1.33)
Black 10.43 10.38 8.94 5.91 5.85 4.97
(1.39)** (1.40)** (1.42)** (1.68)** (1.68)** (1.71)**
Wealth no no yes no no yes
Health no no yes no no yes
Age eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes
Year eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 14493 14493 14493 10237 10237 10237
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.11
Notes: The non-numbered column reports the sample means. The excluded educational
category is high school. Clustered (by individual) standard errors in parentheses;
Bootstrapping (using 200 rep.) the standard errors by individual to account for both
clustering, and also for the variation due to the ﬁrst-step estimation of the probabilities of
misclassiﬁcation of contacting the SSA has negligible eﬀects on the standard errors (results
available upon request). * signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent. Sample: HRS
1992-2002, age 55-65.
17Pr(Ct = 1|Ct−2 = 0) is to use the cross–sectional information using age as a measure
of time. Our estimate of Pr(Ct = 1|Ct−2 = 0) is going to be equal to the coeﬃcient
on age×1/2 from Table 1. Age is multiplied by 1/2 in order to estimate the probability
over a 2-year period (the HRS is biennial). When we control for sex, education, race and
marital status the estimate is 0.0832 with a standard deviation of 0.0054.
Although we don’t know Pr(Nt = 1|Ct = 1) = E(Nt|Ct = 1) and Pr(Nt = 1|Ct =
0) = E(Nt|Ct = 0) for the years after 1994, we can estimate these probabilities using data
from the 1992 and 1994 waves assuming that the probability of contacting SSA and the
eﬀects from contacting SSA wouldn’t have changed over time. Given these assumptions
the overstatement of the eﬀect of the Statement for workers who didn’t contact SSA is
approximately equal to 2.4 percentage points (30 percent) when using data up to 1996:
[E(Nt−2|Ct−2 = 1) − E(Nt−2|Ct−2 = 0)]P(Ct = 1|Ct−2 = 0) = 0.30 × 0.08.
A similar conclusion is reached when, in order to use the whole data, we estimate a
regression model with known probabilities of misclassiﬁcation of the variable C. Deﬁning
C∗ as the true event and C as the misclassiﬁed one, the true eﬀect of the Statement for
group x is proportional to the misclassiﬁed one
[E (N|C = 0,T = x) − E (N|C = 1,T = x)]
= [E(N|C∗ = 0,T = x) − E(N|C∗ = 1,T = x)]
×Pr(C∗ = 0|C = 0), x = 0,1
where the factor of proportionality is the probability of correctly classifying 1 − C.
Controlling for other X’s, it can be shown that the estimated true eﬀect of the Statement
is equal to b β11 in the following linear model:17
17In order to control for the variation that is due to the ﬁrst step, we can either use a modiﬁed version
of Murphy and Topel (1985)’s two-step estimator that accounts for the panel structure (dependence over
time), or we can simply bootstrap clusters of individuals and than run the ﬁrst and second step. Since
doing so has negligible eﬀects on the standard errors (mainly due to the precision of the estimate of
Pr(Ct = 1|Ct−2 = 0,X)), the analysis is carried out conditional on the estimate from the ﬁrst stage.
18N = β00 + β01 (1 − C)Pr(C
∗ = 0|C = 0,X) + β10T1
+β11 (1 − C)Pr(C
∗ = 0|C = 0,X)T1 + X
′γ + ǫ. (2)
This is the speciﬁcation used from column (4) on, where we interact the probability
of not having contacted the SSA and the post–Statement variable. This way we measure
the treatment eﬀect on the treated, and indeed the entire eﬀect of the Statement is
concentrated among those who never contacted the SSA (66 percent of the sample).
Column (4) shows that not having contacted the SSA increases the initial probability of
not reporting an estimate in the pre–Statement period by 30 percentage points, a very
large eﬀect. Notice also that this additional variable captures half of the eﬀect of being
black and reduces the diﬀerences due to the level of education. This means that blacks
and workers with low levels of education are not only less likely to contact SSA in order
to get informed, but are also less likely to get informed using other channels.
For those that don’t contact the SSA, the Statement reduces the probability of not
reporting an estimate by 10 percentage points, approximately one third of the initial
diﬀerence. Columns (5) and (6) show that controlling for age and year ﬁxed eﬀects and
for health and wealth does not change the estimated eﬀects of the Statement.18
The eﬀect on knowledge could be diﬀerent at diﬀerent ages, and thus could have very
diﬀerent eﬀects on retirement behavior. The eﬀect could be concentrated among younger
workers, this way having only the eﬀect of anticipating the information, with a small
potential of changing retirement behavior. In order to capture how the Statement can
diﬀerently aﬀect diﬀerent age groups, the ﬁrst column in Table 3 reports for each age the
fraction of workers who have contacted the SSA. Since almost all workers claim by age
65, the table is truncated at age 64. Most workers contact the SSA when they are close to
retirement. Around 30 percent call in their 50s, while an additional 20 percent call when
they approach the early retirement age.
18The results are not diﬀerent when, disregarding an endogeneity problem, we also control for the time
left from the expected retirement date (results available upon request).
19Table 3: Linear probability (in percent) model of not being able to provide a Social
Security beneﬁts estimate by age.
Contacted Contacted SSA Did not contact SSA
Age SSA Pre-SSS Pre-Post Pre-Post Pre-SSS Pre-Post Pre-Post
55 0.23 23.54 -3.43 -8.11 47.77 -7.33 -9.57
(2.84)** (6.24) (6.29) (2.40)** (6.65) (6.67)
56 0.27 18.97 3.74 1.96 52.06 -7.25 -8.13
(2.62)** (5.13) (5.11) (2.53)** (4.92) (4.86)
57 0.25 20.53 1.90 -0.22 49.13 -5.91 -6.45
(2.92)** (4.74) (4.74) (2.56)** (4.30) (4.20)
58 0.36 22.00 -3.60 -3.87 53.30 -7.14 -7.66
(3.39)** (4.08) (4.16) (3.71)** (4.45) (4.46)
59 0.34 19.71 0.95 1.94 57.46 -16.08 -15.89
(3.41)** (4.10) (4.15) (3.68)** (4.34)** (4.33)**
60 0.37 15.22 -0.65 -0.56 57.82 -15.57 -16.06
(3.06)** (3.55) (3.77) (4.08)** (4.65)** (4.85)**
61 0.47 10.00 4.89 6.12 57.50 -22.17 -20.91
(2.31)** (2.87) (3.17) (4.52)** (4.99)** (5.02)**
62 0.55 12.15 -1.78 -0.39 56.34 -24.01 -23.21
(3.16)** (3.76) (4.01) (5.90)** (6.53)** (6.78)**
63 0.59 11.43 0.98 0.99 54.05 -20.86 -20.95
(3.81)** (4.57) (4.67) (8.21)** (8.87)* (8.85)*
64 0.64 14.29 -0.69 -5.09 33.33 2.59 -4.28
(9.37) (9.80) (9.50) (15.75)* (16.28) (16.24)
Other Xs no yes no yes
Notes: The ﬁrst column reports the fraction contacting the SSA. “Pre” columns report the fraction of
workers who do not provide an estimate during the Pre–Statement period. Pre–Post columns report
changes in the probability of providing a beneﬁt estimate. Fractions are computed separately for
workers who contacted (ﬁrst three columns) and those who didn’t contact the SSA (last three columns).
Clustered (by individual) standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapping (using 200 rep.) the standard
errors by individual to account for both clustering, and for the variation due to the ﬁrst-step estimation
of the probabilities of misclassiﬁcation of contacting the SSA has negligible eﬀects on the signiﬁcance
level (results available upon request). * signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent. Sample:
HRS 1992-2002, age 55-64.
20In the remaining columns of Table 3, we analyze how at diﬀerent ages the probability
of reporting a beneﬁt estimate changes upon receiving a Statement.19 The sample is
split into those who did and those who didn’t contact the SSA (using again a model
with misclassiﬁcation and known probabilities of misclassiﬁcation). Among those who
contacted the SSA there is a clear reduction in the probability of not reporting an estimate
as we approach the early retirement age. There is no such pattern for those who didn’t
contact the SSA in the pre–Statement period. In the post–Statement period, there is a
clear improvement around the early retirement age. The eﬀect of the introduction of the
Statement can be seen by looking at the Pre − Post columns. There are 2 Pre − Post
columns, the ﬁrst does not control for other regressors (gender, education, experience,
and veteran status), the other does. Among those who contacted the SSA the diﬀerences
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. On the other hand, among workers who didn’t
contact the SSA, the Statement reduced the fraction by around 10 percentage points up
to age 58 and 20 percentage points afterwards. In relative terms, the eﬀect around the
early retirement age is to reduce the fraction of workers that are unable to provide a
beneﬁt estimate by almost one half.20 After age 58 the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level (except at age 64 where the sample size is also very small).
The Statement has a signiﬁcantly larger impact at ages close to the early retirement
age. It generates little additional information for workers who are far from retiring.
Up until now we haven’t considered the possibility that a worker’s knowledge about
the beneﬁts may be positively inﬂuenced when someone else in the household receives
a Statement. The HRS allows us to analyze how worker’s knowledge changes when the
spouse receives a Statement. In Table 4 we compute the probability of being unable to
provide an estimate by the worker’s own Statement status and the spouse’s Statement
19We performed a similar analysis using instead of age the expected number of remaining years from
retirement, and the results were very similar.
20The eﬀect at even earlier ages are small. Workers in their 40s and early 50s are only 3-6 percentage
points more likely to provide an estimate as a consequence of receiving the Statement (results available
upon request). This cast some doubt on the utility of sending the Statements to young workers that seem
to show little interest for them. The estimated cost of sending each Statement is about 56 cents. Given
that around 136 million Statements are sent out every year, the total cost is approximately $75 million.
More than half of this amount could be saved by sending Statements to older workers only.
21status, separately by gender and by whether the worker contacted the SSA. For those
workers who contacted the SSA there are no changes due to their own or the spouse’s
Statement. Among workers who didn’t contact the SSA, the eﬀect of the own Statement
(vertical comparison) tends to be larger among men than among women, while the eﬀect
of the spouse’s Statement is around 2 percentage points for men and at least 5 times
as large for women.21 This is consistent with the Social Security rules about dependent
spouse beneﬁts: A spouse receives the highest amount between her own beneﬁts and one
half of the worker’s beneﬁts. Since the majority of women are better oﬀ claiming through
their husband’s account, the husbands’ Statements tend to carry more information.
Table 4: Spillover eﬀects on the probability (in percent) of not being able to provide a
Social Security beneﬁts estimate by age.
Spouse’s Statement period
Did not contact SSA Contacted SSA




Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Pre 58.4 49.1 45.7 43.5 26.2 24.1 15.2 12.9
(1.3) (2.6) (1.3) (4.5) (1.7) (3.7) (1.1) (4.3)
[1354] [375] [1440] [124] [699] [137] [1076] [62]
Post 64.5 40.9 32.8 29.7 17.6 20.7 13.1 12.8
(8.7) (1.0) (2.7) (1.0) (9.5) (1.3) (2.5) (0.9)
[31] [2361] [311] [2109] [17] [1025] [176] [1246]
Notes: Sample: HRS 1992-2002, age 55-64. Standard errors in parentheses and sample size in squared
brackets.
Once we established that the Statement reduces the probability that workers are un-
able to provide an estimate of their future beneﬁts, we can analyze whether those who
provide an estimate improved their forecasts. Figure 1 shows the density of the forecast
error (the diﬀerence between the expected and the actual beneﬁts) for those workers who
did and didn’t contact the SSA.22 23 Errors seem to be approximately distributed sym-
21Notice that the value of 64.5 that corresponds to the case where the female worker received a State-
ment but her younger spouse didn’t is due to the limited sample size imprecisely estimated.
22Beneﬁts are expressed in 2003 dollars using the CPI. We take into account that actual Social Security
beneﬁts refer to the year before the interview. Results using the relative forecast error are similar.
23Note that to highlight the distributional diﬀerences we truncated the distribution of the error at
±$1000 (3 percent of the sample).
22metrically around zero, which suggests that, on average, there is no prediction bias. In the
pre-Statement period (solid line) the variability of the errors for workers who didn’t con-
tact the SSA is much larger than for those who contacted the SSA; this diﬀerence seems
to disappear once the Statement is introduced (dashed line). As before, this change in the
distribution of the error term is likely to be upward biased by the fact that some workers
would have contacted the SSA in the absence of the Statement. Substituting workers who
didn’t contact the SSA with workers who contacted the SSA with probability equal to
the probability of contacting the SSA over a two-year period,24 and plotting the corre-
sponding pre-Statement density allow us to judge the expected improvement that is not






















































































Figure 1: Monthly forecast error. Epanechnikov kernel estimate using a $35 bandwidth.
Sample: HRS 1992-1996, age 55-65.
In Table 5, we test whether the distributional diﬀerences in Figure 1 are signiﬁcant.
For workers who didn’t contact the SSA we use the pre–Statement density that controls
for the expected improvements (dashed line). Most of the improvement seems to lie
within one standard deviation from the mean, which is why we test if the ratio of the
pre–Statement to the post–Statement variance is larger than one, truncating the error at
±$1000, ±$500, and ±$300.25 The p-value of this one-sided test for those who didn’t
24These graphs use only information up to 1996 and therefore the probability is simply equal to 8
percent.
25The reason to use truncated values is that variances are highly sensitive to outliers. Without trun-
cation the variance of the error is even larger in the pre–Statement period. In the HRS, respondents can
report weekly, monthly, biyearly, and yearly values. The big discrepancies seem to be due to the few
observations with measurement errors in the variable that reports this “frequency” variable.
23contact the SSA is equal to 10 percent for the $1000 truncation but quickly drops to
being signiﬁcant as we concentrate the analysis to errors that are closer to the median.
For those who contacted the SSA we can reject the hypothesis that the variance decreased
after the introduction of the Statement. It is worth noting that although the variance of
the forecast error decreased for those who were previously uninformed, similarly to what
we observed before for the probability of reporting an estimate, their post Statement
errors are still larger compared to the other group.
Table 5: Variance ratio test
Did not contact SSA Contacted SSA
Standard Dev. p-value Standard Dev. p-value
Pre-SSS Post-SSS Pre/Post Pre-SSS Post-SSS Pre/Post
Forecast error truncated at:
|e| < $1000 342.67 324.81 0.109 270.73 265.15 0.299
[781] [416] [1350] [449]
|e| < $500 225.89 204.28 0.016 189.13 181.00 0.141
[661] [364] [1240] [415]
|e| < $300 158.53 131.35 0.000 132.36 128.97 0.278
[527] [299] [1072] [366]
Notes: Standard deviation of the errors and p-value of a variance ratio test with null-hypothesis
H0 : Vpre/Vpost < 1. Estimates control for the improvement in the standard deviation of the
forecast error that is independent of the Statement by using the dashed line version of Figure 1 for
the pre-Statement period. Since variances are highly sensitive to outliers we test the null using
three truncated versions of the forecast error. Numbers of observations in square brackets. Sample:
HRS 1992-1996, age 55-65.
The above analysis suggests that thanks to the Statement some workers became more
knowledgeable about their Social Security beneﬁts. The workers for whom we observe an
improvement didn’t contact the SSA before. The proﬁle of those workers is consistent with
the idea that information is costly. Controlling for various factors we are able to reduce
educational gaps by around one half and racial gaps by around one third. While the
remaining diﬀerences could be due to diﬀerent preferences over leisure, another possible
reason might be ﬁnancial illiteracy.26 Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) show that black workers
and workers with low levels of education are signiﬁcantly less likely to respond correctly
to simple questions about compound interest, inﬂation, and portfolio management.
The important lesson is that the free availability of information is not suﬃcient to
26Another explanation may be that some workers prefer to procrastinate (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999).
24get informed. Obtaining information seems to be costly and prevents workers who think
that information to be less valuable to become knowledgeable. Stimulating workers by
directly providing them with information reduces that cost and has the predictable eﬀect
of improving workers’ knowledge. In the next section, we test whether and how the new
information aﬀected workers’ retirement decisions.
5 The eﬀect of the Statement on retirement and So-
cial Security beneﬁt claiming decisions
The additional information provided by the Statement can inﬂuence workers’ behavior
in many ways. There may be a “surprise” eﬀect: workers who overestimated their ex-
pected Social Security beneﬁts should react by working and saving more, while those who
underestimated their beneﬁts should do the opposite. Although changes in labor supply
may also happen at the intensive level (hours), we focus on changes at the extensive
level (participation). Since forecast errors are approximately symmetrically distributed
around zero, these changes may go in both directions. Also, as over time the age at which
workers received their ﬁrst Statement decreases, we should expect these “surprise” eﬀects
to weaken. In addition, even if the decision of becoming informed is the sole product
of a maximization process with costly information, at the margin the Statement should
strengthen the link between Social Security incentives and retirement.
Because of liquidity constraints and the earnings test (ET), the retirement decision is
strongly related to the claiming decision. According to the HRS data, half of the time
the monthly self-reported retirement date and the monthly self-reported claiming date
are not more than 12 months apart from each other. When the diﬀerence between the
two dates is larger than one year, the diﬀerence is mainly due to early retirement. Among
those who retire at or after age 62, 75 percent claim and retire within a year. Since
the administrative records do not have information about self-reported retirement status,
for those workers who show positive earnings in the previous year, we measure retirement
based on claiming Social Security beneﬁts. Alternatively, we could deﬁne retirement based
25on some given changes in earnings.
There is very little analysis of the claiming decision for those workers who have already
retired and therefore face a ﬁnancial decision. The decision to postpone claiming is
equivalent to the decision to purchase additional annuities. Coile, Diamond, Gruber
and Jousten (2002) show that for some male workers, typically those who are married
and face long “joint” life expectancies, delaying claiming of Social Security beneﬁts after
age 62 can generate substantial gains, and that these gains may actually be 10 or more
times greater when risk aversion is taken into account.
Before moving to the analysis, we need to mention the other major Social Security
reforms that happen around the time of the introduction of the Statement. The most
important reform is the 2000 earnings test removal for workers above the normal retire-
ment age (usually 65). Earnings of Social Security beneﬁciaries above the earnings test
threshold, up to their beneﬁt amount, are taxed away at a 50 percent rate between age 62
and 65, and, before 2000, at a 33 percent rate between 65 and 69. Although the earnings
tax is only that high for myopic workers, the reason being that beneﬁts that are taxed
away increase future beneﬁts at an almost actuarially fair rate through the so-called re-
computation, workers are sensitive to the tax. The removal had the eﬀect of increasing
the fraction of workers who claim their Social Security beneﬁts at the normal retirement
age, the age at which the tax was removed (Mastrobuoni 2006).
The other two reforms changed the beneﬁt formula and will be included in our beneﬁt
calculations. In response to an earlier “crisis” in Social Security ﬁnancing two decades ago,
the US Congress implemented both a reduction in the Normal Retirement Age (NRA)
of two months per year for cohorts born in 1938 and afterward, and, staring in 1986, an
increase in the delayed retirement credit (DRC),27 that is the actuarial adjustment to the
beneﬁts when retirement is postponed beyond the normal retirement age. The DRC has
been increased by half a percent every other year from its original 3 percent. It is going
to reach its ﬁnal value of 8 percent for workers born in 1943 or later.
27See Mastrobuoni (2005).
265.1 The eﬀect of the Statement on workers’ expected claiming
behavior
Before looking at the actual retirement and claiming behavior, we can analyze whether
at the time workers received the Statements they change when they expect to retire.28
We should expect workers to be more likely to change their expectations when they
receive their ﬁrst Statement, and less likely afterwards. Using the panel structure of the
HRS, we estimate the eﬀect of the Statement on the probability that the expected claiming
age stays constant.29 All regressions include age ﬁxed eﬀects, levels of education, marital
status and race. We also control for a linear time trend and for the 2000 earnings test
removal. In Table 6, we report the marginal eﬀects of the Statement on the probability of
keeping the same expected claiming age. The ﬁrst column allows for just a one-time eﬀect,
which is small and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Column (2) shows that those who
did not contact the SSA are signiﬁcantly more likely to change their expected claiming
age.30 The estimates in both of these columns are contaminated by the fact that the ﬁrst
Statement should have the opposite eﬀect than subsequent Statements. In column (3), we
include an indicator variable equal to one when the person already received a Statement
in the previous wave. The coeﬃcient has a positive sign, meaning that receiving a second
Statement increases the probability of maintaining the same expected age, though the
eﬀect is only signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. In column (4), we interact both Statement
eﬀects with the “No SSA contact” dummy. Both, the eﬀect of the ﬁrst Statement and
the eﬀect of additional Statements is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for the two groups.
Workers may not pay attention to the ﬁrst Statement they receive, so there is a
potential measurement error problem. This may explain why the eﬀects are generally
small and not signiﬁcant. This measurement error problem is less salient when analyzing
28See Chan and Stevens (2004), who estimate a model of expected retirement.
29We tried to replicate the same analysis with respect to the expected retirement age, though only
a few workers are asked about their expected retirement date, and so the sample size was too small to
estimate any eﬀect.
30We control for the fact that contacting SSA is endogenous by estimating the model using the prob-
abilities of misclassiﬁcation in same manner as when we dealt with the probability of providing a beneﬁt
estimate.
27Table 6: Marginal eﬀects (in percent) on the probability of keeping
the same expected age of claiming.
P(same expected claiming age)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-statement -2.10 -4.14 -1.88 -3.66
(2.39) (3.05) (2.41) (3.15)
No SSA contact -4.68 -4.81
(2.30)* (2.30)*
Post-st.× No SSA cont. -0.23 0.03
(2.98) (3.27)
Additional statements 4.42 4.17
(2.45) (3.30)
Additional st.× No SSA cont. -0.25
(3.85)
Post-ET removal -3.54 -6.16 -5.02 -7.02
(2.66) (2.97)* (2.78) (3.02)*
Year -0.19 0.64 -0.63 0.14
(0.63) (0.72) (0.690) (0.80)
Observations 5961 5022 5961 5022
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
Mean 66.72 67.58 66.72 67.58
Notes: The marginal eﬀects are estimated using a linear probability model.
We additionally control for age, age squared, education, marital status, race,
and veteran status. Clustered (by individuals) standard errors in parentheses;
* signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent. Sample: HRS
1992-2002, age 55-65.
28actual retirement behavior. Each Statement should have the eﬀect of improving workers
response to retirement incentives.
5.2 Social Security incentives
In order to analyze whether workers became more responsive to Social Security incentives,
we need to forecast earnings and compute future beneﬁts as a function of the retirement
age. Below we brieﬂy review the main provisions of the beneﬁt formula and the assump-
tions needed to compute the SSW.
In order to compute Social Security beneﬁts Bt(a) for each retirement age we need to
forecast earnings. To best approximate the information contained in the Statement we
use the same assumptions the SSA uses in calculating the beneﬁts for the Social Security
Statement. The Statement assumes that if the worker doesn’t retire he is likely to earn
the same amount he earned last year (or the year before if last year’s earnings are zero).
In other words, real earnings are assumed to follow a random walk, so that the previous
year’s earnings are the best predictor for future earnings. This assumption is not very
diﬀerent from Coile and Gruber (2001), who assume that real earnings are expected to
grow by one percent. Every year, beneﬁts are then computed as a function of age (from
age 55 to 70) and as a function of the retirement age (from the worker’s actual age to
age 70). The beneﬁt rules are held constant, and it is assumed that promised beneﬁts are
going to be paid. Workers who retire before age 62 are assumed to claim at age 62.
We do not model the spouse’s retirement decision, and we assume that the spouse
claims at the earliest possible age.31 A spouse is deﬁned as “independent” when her own
beneﬁts at age 62 are larger than 50 percent of her husband’s beneﬁts at age 62. In this
case her SSW is not added to her husbands SSW but enters the regression independently.
Beneﬁts are a function of the weighted average of the highest 35 years of average
wage-indexed earnings, called the AIME. Since workers tend to have lower earnings at
the beginning of their career than at the end working an additional year normally increases
future beneﬁts even at age 62, which generates an additional incentive to work (Blinder,
31Most of the times it is age 62, which also represents the median claiming age
29Gordon and Wise 1981). However, between age 55 and 61 the increase in Social Security
beneﬁts is modest. Its median ranges between 1 percent and 2 percent, and the 75th
percentile between 1 percent and 4 percent (Table 7). Starting at age 62 instead, the
increase is substantial. An 8 percent actuarial adjustment has to be added to the median
1 percent increase that is due to current earnings. The 75th percentile reaches almost 10
percent. Looking at beneﬁts only doesn’t take into account that working an additional
year means that beneﬁts are not collected in that year, and that Social Security taxes are
paid on the additional earnings up to the maximum taxable threshold. Whether workers
think that future beneﬁts make up for this loss depends on the number of years that they,
and possibly their spouses, expect to collect beneﬁts. It also depends on their discount
rate. In other words, it depends on changes in the expected present discounted value of
the Social Security beneﬁts net of contributions. The SSW is a function of time t and
retirement age a:





Following the literature we use a real discount rate of 3 percent (β = 1.03).32 Bt(a)’s
are expressed in 2003 dollars using the CPI, and the conditional probabilities of survival,
pt(s), are based on the SSA’s cohort-speciﬁc life tables.33 Since we lack precise information
on dependent children, the beneﬁts include dependent beneﬁts and survivors’ beneﬁts,
related only to the spouse. In that case pt(s) is a column vector where the entries are:
the probability that only the worker survives, the probability that only his wife survives,
and the probability that both survive. Bt(a) is a row vector containing the worker’s
32There is some evidence that discount rates may actually be larger than 3 percent (Samwick 1998).
On the other hand, Blinder et al. (1981) argue that in the absence of borrowing constraints it is more
appropriate to use a real interest rate instead, which can be assumed to be very low (they use 1 percent).
We follow the mainstream literature and use a 3 percent discount rate, though the reduced form model
estimated controlling for age seems to be robust to the use of diﬀerent discount rates. The reason is that
controlling for age the eﬀect of the accrual is mostly identiﬁed by the accrual’s cross-sectional variation
within age, while the use of diﬀerent discount rates generates mainly large diﬀerences across age.
33The life tables are prepared by the Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary in the Social Security Administration.
Projected death rates and life tables are based on Alternative II forecasts for the 1998 Trustees report
(taken from the Berkeley Mortality Database). To compute total Social Security beneﬁts (including
spouse’s beneﬁts and survivors’ beneﬁts) when using the tables we are implicitly assuming that the
couple’s individual mortalities are independent.
30own beneﬁts, the survivors’s beneﬁts, and the sum of the worker’s own beneﬁts and the
dependent spouse’s beneﬁts.
The Social Security accrual is the expected gain in SSW from waiting an additional
year before retiring,
ACCt(a) = SSWt(a + 1) − SSWt(a), (4)
while the peak-value (PV) (Coile and Gruber 2001) is the diﬀerence between the maximum
SSW and the current SSW,
PVt(a) = max
x SSWt(x) − SSWt(a). (5)
Retirement decisions based on PV’s and ACC’s diﬀer whenever ACC’s are not monotonic
relative to the retirement age.
An additional complication comes from Social Security payroll taxes and income taxes.
We also compute the accrual net of Social Security taxes, tWt(a), assuming, like in Di-
amond and Gruber (1998), that workers bear the entire payroll tax, t (t = 12.4 percent
since 1990). Since we do not observe income we do not attempt to try to simulate income
taxes, though in the regressions the diﬀerent tax treatment of Social Security beneﬁts
should in part be absorbed by the coeﬃcient on earnings.34
In Table 7 we show the median (and some 75th percentiles) of the expected growth
rates in Social Security beneﬁts and SSW for male workers at diﬀerent ages. There is
signiﬁcant heterogeneity in expected increases in beneﬁts from postponing retirement.
This heterogeneity is mainly due to eligibility criteria to diﬀerent types of beneﬁts (i.e.,
dependent spouse’s beneﬁts), to diﬀerences in earnings histories, and to diﬀerences in
current earnings. Men who evaluate the future streams of Social Security beneﬁts taking
only their own beneﬁts into consideration (either because they have no dependents, or
34If a beneﬁciary ﬁles a federal tax return as “an individual,” (“a couple”) and the combined income
is between $25,000 and $34,000 ($32,000 and $44,000) in 2004, he or she pays taxes on 50 percent of the
Social Security beneﬁts. If the combined income is more than $34,000 ($44,000), up to 85 percent of the
Social Security beneﬁts are subject to income tax.
31because their spouses are better oﬀ by claiming their own beneﬁts) generally face negative
or null increases in SSW from additional work.
Table 7: Median expected growth rates of Social Security beneﬁts and social security
wealth as a function of age.
B(t+1)
B(t) − 1 SSW(t + 1)/SSW(t) − 1
Own Beneﬁts Own+Dependent spouse
Median Median 75th percentile
Pre-tax After-tax Pre-tax After-tax Pre-tax After-tax
55 2.0% 2.0% -1.4% 2.0% -0.5% 3.6% 0.2%
56 1.8 1.8 -1.4 1.8 -0.6 3.1 0.0
57 1.3 1.3 -1.6 1.3 -0.9 2.3 0.0
58 1.1 1.1 -1.6 1.1 -1.0 1.9 0.0
59 1.0 1.0 -1.6 1.0 -1.0 1.6 0.0
60 0.8 0.8 -1.5 0.8 -0.9 1.4 0.0
61 0.6 0.6 -1.3 0.6 -0.9 1.2 0.0
62 8.9 1.0 -0.6 2.2 0.5 4.2 2.8
63 8.0 0.0 -1.1 1.1 -0.2 3.3 2.1
64 7.3 -0.9 -1.6 0.3 -0.9 2.5 1.2
65 5.1 -3.3 -4.3 -2.2 -3.0 -0.7 -1.6
66 4.7 -3.8 -4.7 -2.9 -3.5 -1.5 -2.2
67 4.3 -4.6 -5.2 -3.6 -4.0 -2.3 -2.9
68 4.0 -5.1 -5.6 -4.2 -4.5 -3.0 -3.4
69 3.8 -5.6 -6.0 -4.8 -5.0 -3.6 -3.8
Notes: The After-tax columns represent the changes in SSW net of Social Security payroll taxes,
assuming that workers carry the whole tax burden. Sample: SIPP linked to administrative data.
5.3 The eﬀect of the Statement on claiming and retirement be-
havior
Next we look at the diﬀerence between the pre–Statement and the post–Statement claim-
ing hazards, and we do it separately for workers who retired before age 62 (they face only
a ﬁnancial decision) and for workers who are working at age 62.35 The hazard is deﬁned
as the probability of claiming within a year, conditional on not having claimed before.
Figure 2 shows that among the working sample 50 percent claim at the early retirement
35A person is assumed to be working when his forecasted earnings are diﬀerent from zero. This represent
an almost absorbing state. Among workers aged 62 to 69 only 3.6 percent experiences positive earnings
after having zero forecasted earnings, with average earnings of $6745.
32age. There is also a pronounced spike at age 65. There seem to be some diﬀerences be-
tween the pre and the post–Statement period, mainly after age 64, though part of these
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Figure 3: Claiming hazards for the retired
sample
The hazard rates for the sample of workers who are already retired show a diﬀerent
pattern. More than 70 percent of them claim immediately at age 62, while the spike
at 65 reaches 60 percent. Overall, the Statement seems to haven’t changed the 62 and
65 hazards, and to have slightly decreased the 63 and 64 hazards. While there are some
changes in the hazard rates we are not controlling for many factors that may generate these
diﬀerences. More importantly, these diﬀerences do not tell us anything about optimality.
Even if there were no diﬀerences in the hazards, it could still be possible that with the
Statement workers sort themselves in a more optimal way across retirement/claiming ages.
In order to be able to deﬁne optimality we need to introduce a simple theoretical
framework. For clarity of exposition assume there are only two periods. Worker i can
either work (Ri = 0) earning yi and retire the next period or, retire immediately (Ri = 1)
and receive reduced beneﬁts today (bi1). ki > 1 measures his disutility from work. The
worker chooses the retirement date that maximizes his utility:
Vi = max
Ri
yi (1 − Ri) + kibi1Ri + kibi2 (1 + a(1 − Ri)). (6)
33It is optimal to retire immediately when
OVi = yi + kibi2 (1 + a) − ki (bi1 + bi2) = yi + kiACCi ≤ 0, (7)
where ACCi = bi2 (1 + a)−(bi1 + bi2) represents the Social Security accrual. This expres-
sion tells us that the worker should retire whenever his Option Value (OV) is either zero
or negative. Notice that the disutility from work (ki) is individual-speciﬁc.
This simpliﬁed model has been used extensively in the retirement literature. Coile
and Gruber (n.d.) estimate a probit reduced form model of retirement that incorporates
forward-looking Social Security incentives. Their concept is based on the Option Value
model of Stock and Wise (1990), a model that resembles a dynamic programming model
although it introduces some important simpliﬁcations. As we saw in Table 7, accruals
tend to be decreasing with age except between ages 61 and 62. Since workers may be
forward-looking and incorporate future accruals in their retirement decisions Coile and
Gruber (n.d.) and numerous papers that follow their approach use the peak value as
the main measure of Social Security incentives. All of these papers use reduced form PV
probits, and assume a constant coeﬃcient on the PV.36
Since the Social Security Statement is sent to workers depending on time and age, it
is extremely important to properly control for these two variables. For this reason we use
a random coeﬃcient linear probability model, though very similar results are obtained
when using a proportional hazard model where the eﬀects of the ACC are allowed to vary
by age and socioeconomic characteristics (McCall 1994).
Unlike most of the previous literature, we will deﬁne retirement almost entirely based
on the claiming status. The main reason is that while claiming Social Security beneﬁts
is well-deﬁned, there is no variable that measures precisely the retirement date. We may
say that a person is retired if we observe a large drop in her earnings. This is, however, a
noisy measure of retirement, and it is not obvious that it is better than the one based on
claiming Social Security beneﬁts. The third reason is that deﬁning retirement based on
36Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), instead, assume that the heterogeneity in ki depends on health, age,
and year of birth.
34beneﬁt receipt restricts the analysis to people above age 62. Above age 62 accruals are
monotonically decreasing, which allows us to focus on the accruals instead of using the
PVs. When monotonic, accruals are a better measure of incentives than PVs. The reason
is that two workers with the same PV may face very diﬀerent incentives if the ﬁrst has
his peak in SSW in one year and the second has his peak in 5 years. Our model is
Ri = kiACCi + β
′˜ xi + ǫi, (8)
where ˜ xi denotes the other regressor, including the forecasted earnings (yi). We generally
set ˜ xi = xi − ¯ x for continuous variables and exclude the median when dealing with
categorical variables.
First, we assume that ki is constant across people and independent of the Statement
T ∈ {0,1}, while later we allow ki to vary:
ki = α0 + α1Ti + γ
′
0˜ zi + γ
′
1˜ ziTi + νi. (9)
α0 is the eﬀect of the accrual for the “baseline” worker in the pre–Statement period.
Substituting ki into Eq. (8) we get,
Ri = [α0 + α1Ti + γ
′
0˜ zi + γ
′
1˜ ziTi]ACCi + β
′˜ xi + ui, (10)
where ui = ǫi + νiACCi. In this setup, α1 represents the diﬀerence between the post–
and the pre–Statement period in the marginal eﬀect of a unit ($100,000) increase in the
accrual on the probability of retirement for the baseline case:
α1 =
∂P (R = 1)
∂ACC
|˜ z=0,Ti=1 −
∂P (R = 1)
∂ACC
|˜ z=0,Ti=0. (11)
To ease the interpretation of the regression coeﬃcients all z’s are dichotomous variables.
35In such a case
α1 + γ1 =
∂P (R = 1)
∂ACC
|˜ z=1,Ti=1 −
∂P (R = 1)
∂ACC
|˜ z=1,Ti=0 (12)
represents the Post−Pre eﬀect for a worker with z = 1. It follows that γ1 is equal to Eq. 12
minus Eq. 11 and represents the diﬀerence of Post − Pre eﬀects between workers with
characteristics ˜ z = 1 and workers with baseline characteristics, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence.
To relax the assumption that workers retire and claim at the same time, we perform
the regression for the entire sample ﬁrst, and then separately for those who work, and
for those who are retired. Later, since the results based on the whole sample are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those of the working sample, we show only the latter.
In order to control for changes in claiming behavior that may be due to the earnings
test removal, we include a post-ET removal dummy, both in X and in Z.37 We also
control for the average ET tax.38 The higher the average tax, the higher the incentive for
a worker who claims his beneﬁts to start earning less or stop working altogether. Table 13
in the Appendix shows the summary statistics for the sample used in the regressions.
All regressions control for the worker’s own SSW, his spouse’s SSW, retirement status
of his spouse, earnings (potential), age dummies, year, year squared, post–Statement
dummy, a post-earnings test removal dummy, level of education, marital status, AIME
at age 55, real estate property wealth, health insurance, diﬀerence in age relative to his
spouse, SIPP panel dummies, children in the household, pension information, veteran
status, experience, and experience squared.
It is likely that the same factors that determine ﬁxed costs or ﬁxed opportunities
from work also aﬀect the disutility from work, ki.39 And, even more importantly, it
37When we restrict the analysis only to the period before the ET was removed (1984–1999) the results
tend to be of similar size though less signiﬁcant.
38The average ET tax is tET = min(benefits,(earnings − ETthreshold) × marginaltax)/benefits.
When earnings are below the ET threshold, the marginal tax and the average tax are zero. Table 13 in
the Appendix shows that the average tax is 0.60, while the average marginal tax is 0.34. Special rules
apply the ﬁrst year a worker claims his beneﬁts. Under these rules, a worker can use a monthly test
amount. If he claims and retires during the year, he can get a full Social Security check for any whole
month he is retired, regardless of his yearly earnings. Since we do not have information on monthly
earnings we cannot control for this case, which is why the average tax may be measured with some error.
39The weight put on leisure is also likely to depend on complementarities relative to other consumption
36is very likely that the previously observed heterogeneity in the level of knowledge of
Social Security beneﬁts aﬀects the observed ki through some sort of individual-speciﬁc
measurement error. If we observe the true accrual ACC, but workers base their decisions
on their perceived and mismeasured accrual [ ACC, the estimated eﬀect will be downward
biased (relative to workers’ actual intentions). The bias will be higher the higher the
variance of measurement error V ar([ ACC − ACC).
Column (1) of Table 8 shows the results, based on the entire sample, when we estimate
Eq. (8) assuming that ki is constant. Including a post–Statement dummy, we allow the
Statement to have an eﬀect on the hazard rate, but not through the accrual.
The coeﬃcient on the accrual tells us that a $1,000 increase in the accrual decreases
the hazard rate of claiming Social Security beneﬁts by 0.74 percentage points.40
The coeﬃcient on the SSW means that a $10,000 increase in SSW increases the proba-
bility of claiming by 0.9 percentage points. Notice that male workers are twice as respon-
sive to their own SSW than to their spouse’s SSW. The disutility from work is simply the
ratio between the coeﬃcient on the accrual and the coeﬃcient on potential earnings for
the working sample, and is equal to 0.74/0.51 = 1.45, meaning that in retirement workers
value consumption 45 percent more. When the spouse is already retired, workers are 4
percentage points more likely to retire. Restricting the analysis to the people who work
(who represent 5/6th of the sample), the results are not very diﬀerent.
As we saw in Figures 2, for the working sample there are no signiﬁcant changes in the
hazard rate between the pre– and the post–Statement period. The ET removal has a large
eﬀect. In columns (1) and (2) we do not control for the average ET tax (computed using
the forecasted earnings), which is why the coeﬃcient on the post–ET removal dummy is
quite large and signiﬁcant. In column (4) we add the average ET tax to the regression.
This captures most but not all the eﬀect that was measured by the post–ET dummy. The
coeﬃcient on that dummy drops from 0.21 to 0.06, showing that a complete removal of
the ET has an eﬀect that cannot be entirely explained by changes in the average tax.41
goods.
40Panis et al. (2002) estimate a similar regression based on the HRS, though they use a probit and the
PV and ﬁnd a marginal eﬀect of 0.7 percent.
41We also tried to include the marginal tax, though, as expected given the discrete nature of the
37Table 8: Linear probability model of claiming Social Security beneﬁts.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
in $100k ALL WORKING RETIRED WORKING
ACC -0.74 -0.60 0.36 -0.54
(0.08)** (0.09)** (0.28) (0.09)**
Forecasted earnings -0.51 -0.58 -0.26
(0.01)** (0.02)** (0.03)**
SSW 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.06
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.02) (0.01)**
Spouse’s SSW 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.02) (0.01)**
Post–ET removal 0.17 0.21 0.04 0.06
(0.02)** (0.02)** (0.04) (0.02)**
Post–Statement -0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)* (0.01)
Retired Spouse 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.02) (0.01)**
Average ET tax -0.22
(0.01)**
Observations 29178 24694 4484 24694
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.23
Notes: ACC and SSW are expressed in real 2003 dollars. All regressions control for
age dummies, year, year squared, level of education, marital status, AIME at age
55, real estate property wealth, health insurance, diﬀerence in age relative to the
spouse, SIPP panel dummies, children in the household, pension dummy, veteran
status, experience, and experience squared. The baseline worker Clustered (by
individual) standard errors in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant
at 1 percent. Sample: SIPP linked to administrative data.
38Adding the average ET tax also reduces (in absolute values) both the eﬀect of the accrual
(from -0.60 to -0.54) and the eﬀect of earnings (from -0.58 to -0.26).
For the retired sample, where the claiming decision is purely ﬁnancial almost all eﬀects
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The only eﬀect that is signiﬁcant is the one related
to the post–Statement dummy. Those who face only a ﬁnancial decision are 6 percentage
points more likely to postpone claiming after receiving the Statement. This is a large
eﬀect, and represents in relative terms a 12 percent drop.
Next, we estimate Eq. 10, allowing for heterogeneity in ki. Table 9 shows only the
coeﬃcients related to the accruals. The coeﬃcients on earnings and SSW are not shown
since they are almost identical to those seen in Table 8. The ﬁrst row reports the result
for the “baseline” worker. This worker is 62, married, white, has a dependent spouse, a
high school degree, is not a veteran, and has no private pension.
We again divide the sample into those who work and those who are retired. For each
of these groups, the ﬁrst columns show the baseline eﬀect (α0), the post–Statement eﬀect
for the baseline worker (α1) and the post–ET removal eﬀect (θ). The remaining eﬀects in
the ﬁrst columns are the estimated γ0s. The second columns show the Post−Pre eﬀects,
the estimated γ1s.
We start by analyzing the working sample. First, it is important to notice that there
is a considerable amount of heterogeneity in the responsiveness to the accruals. The eﬀect
at age 62 is more than twice as large as the overall eﬀect we saw before, while, at least
in the pre–Statement period, at other ages the eﬀects tend to be signiﬁcantly smaller.
Between age 65 and 67, the eﬀects are not diﬀerent from zero. The main explanation for
this is sample selection. At age 62, those who continue working do so because they face
signiﬁcantly larger accruals. This diﬀerence gets smaller as those with small accruals drop
out the sample once they claim. Since the population gets more homogenous, accruals
lose their predictive power for retirement behavior.
There is no improvement in the responsiveness to ACCs of the baseline worker (aged
62) due to the Social Security Statement. Moreover, there is a slight worsening: the
claiming decision, controlling for the average tax the eﬀect of the marginal tax is close to zero.
39coeﬃcient of 0.41 has the interpretation that a baseline worker, aged 62, etc., shows a
0.41/1.22 = 0.33 drop in the marginal eﬀect of the accrual on the hazard rate.
There are diﬀerential eﬀects relative to age. When compared to individuals at age 62,
there is a signiﬁcant improvement in the eﬀect of accruals on claiming behavior at ages
63 and 64. Before the introduction of the Statement, at age 64, where almost 15 percent
of worker claim, the marginal eﬀect was −1.22 + 0.63 = −0.59. With the introduction
of the Statement the responsiveness increases in absolute values by 0.55 − 0.41 = 0.14.
There are no signiﬁcant improvements at later ages, but, since few workers claim after
age 65, it is diﬃcult to interpret these results.
It is interesting that people seem to behave less optimally at the two peak ages, 62
and 65, while the rest of the population improved their decisions after the Statement was
sent out. One explanation for this may lie in the information contained in the Statement.
Remember that the Statement informs workers about their future Social Security beneﬁts
if they retire at ages 62, or 65, or 70, which may have induced some workers to focus more
on these ages than accruals would predict. This result seems to support the view that
some workers use age 62 and age 65 as focal points for their retirement decision without
paying too much attention to the Social Security incentives.
An interesting result is that in the pre–Statement period workers with a dependent
spouse show smaller responsiveness to accruals than single workers. Since married workers
are more likely to have contacted the SSA, this eﬀect is somehow puzzling. In fact, married
workers with an independent spouse are the most responsive group with respect to Social
Security incentives. Their coeﬃcient is almost twice as large compared to those with a
dependent spouse, and this diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant. This is evidence that many
married workers didn’t, prior to the Statement, take spouses’ beneﬁts (and survivors’
beneﬁts!) into account. The Statement informs workers about family beneﬁts. In fact,
quite surprisingly, the Statement appears to have eliminated the gap between workers
with and without a dependent spouse.
Let us now turn to those variables that were good predictors of contacting the SSA
for a beneﬁt estimate. There seems to be a small, but not signiﬁcant, reduction in
40Table 9: Random coeﬃcient linear model of claiming.
WORKING RETIRED
Post − Pre Post − Pre





Post–ET removal -0.82 0.04
(0.47) (1.40)
Year 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.11
(0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.12)
Black 0.17 0.82 -0.27 -0.41
(0.27) (0.39)* (0.64) (1.13)
Single -0.55 0.91 1.88 0.64
(0.35) (0.51) (1.45) (1.76)
Independent spouse -1.13 1.17 2.61 -1.18
(0.31)** (0.39)** (1.00)** (1.33)
Below high school -0.05 -0.26 0.50 -0.10
(0.19) (0.27) (0.54) (0.88)
Some college -0.13 0.14 0.42 -0.05
(0.18) (0.23) (0.61) (0.85)
College -0.39 0.16 -1.13 0.13
(0.12)** (0.15) (0.45)* (0.64)
Veteran 0.07 -0.18 0.69 -1.33
(0.12) (0.14) (0.47) (0.62)*
Pension 0.65 -0.68 0.21 0.32
(0.15)** (0.19)** (0.62) (0.90)
Missing pension info. -0.09 0.11 -0.72 1.76
(0.15) (0.19) (0.73) (1.02)
Age 63 1.09 -0.33 -0.99 -0.29
(0.13)** (0.14)* (0.78) (0.94)
Age 64 0.63 -0.55 0.58 -0.81
(0.19)** (0.22)* (1.22) (1.50)
Age 65 1.38 0.07 -1.71 0.31
(0.30)** (0.52) (1.18) (1.65)
Age 66 1.55 0.12 -1.52 0.81
(0.63)* (0.85) (1.98) (2.17)
Age 67 1.34 -1.66 0.62 1.05
(0.66)* (0.89) (1.96) (1.91)
Age 68 1.03 -1.18 -1.33 1.18
(0.70) (0.93) (1.88) (1.84)
Age 69 0.39 0.03 -1.79 2.75
(1.33) (1.18) (2.08) (2.13)
Observations 24694 4484
R-squared 0.23 0.29
Notes: Additional controls as in Table 8. Clustered (by individuals) standard
errors in parentheses, * signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
Sample: SIPP linked to administrative data.
41the diﬀerences across levels of education. Consistent with the fact that knowledge was
positively correlated with education, the responsiveness to Social Security incentives is also
increasing with education in the pre–Statement period. Workers with college education
have, compared to workers with high school degrees, coeﬃcients that are in absolute value
39 percentage points larger. These diﬀerences get smaller in the post–Statement period,
as we would expect given that the Statement is more likely to aﬀect those with lower
levels of education.
Compared to the baseline, there is no improvement, but rather a worsening in re-
sponsiveness for blacks. While showing no improvements can be consistent with the
behavior predicted by a model with costly information (as long as the additional infor-
mation doesn’t move workers away from their boundary solutions), a worsening in the
responsiveness represents a puzzle. The worsening is due to the fact that after receiving
the Statement blacks are more likely to claim and retire at the age of 62. This is clearly
shown in Table 5.3 where we measure the unexplained change in the distribution of the
retirement age due to the Statement. This is accomplished by adding the interaction of
age dummies, race dummies, and a post–Statement dummy in the retirement equation
used for the results shown in Table 8. The ﬁrst column shows the result for the whole
working sample, while subsequent columns restrict the sample to few years before and
after the introduction of the Statement. The signiﬁcance of the unexplained jump in
the hazard for black workers at the age of 62 is robust to this regression discontinuity
approach.
Another result is related to the information we have about private pensions. The
positive coeﬃcient on pension variables may capture the fact that for this group we are
likely to mismeasure the actual accrual. The fact that the coeﬃcient on the pension
has almost no eﬀect (0.65-0.68) in the post–Statement period may be due to changes in
pension plans. There has been a dramatic transition from deﬁned beneﬁt plans to deﬁned
contribution plans (Munnell, Cahill and Jivan 2003), which makes it less likely for Social
Security accruals to be contaminated by pension accruals in the post–Statement period.
Let us turn now to the retired sample. Here the estimated eﬀects are quite noisy.
42Table 10: Unexplained Statement–eﬀects on the hazards, by race
Post-Pre Statement WORKING
Control Group: ALL 5 year 4 years 3 years
Age 62, white 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age 62, black 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.14
(0.03)** (0.05)* (0.05)* (0.06)*
Age 63, white 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)*
Age 63, black 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.15
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Age 64, white -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.00
(0.02)** (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 64, black -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.07
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11)
Age 65, white -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03
(0.03)* (0.03)** (0.03) (0.04)
Age 65, black 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
Observations 24694 13293 10526 7819
Notes: All regressions control for age dummies, year, level of education,
marital status, AIME at age 55, real estate property wealth, health insurance,
diﬀerence in age relative to the spouse, SIPP panel dummies, children in the
household, pension dummy, veteran status, experience, and experience
squared. The baseline worker Clustered (by individual) standard errors in
parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent. Sample:
SIPP linked to administrative data.
43This is due to the sample size, but also to the fact that there is no more variation in
accruals due to earnings. Also, for the retired sample the standard deviation of the
accruals is almost half as large as in the working sample (see Table 13 in the Appendix),
which generates noisier regression estimates. The Post − Pre eﬀects are generally not
signiﬁcant, probably because those who face only a ﬁnancial decision are more likely to
have already gathered the information contained in the Statement. Nevertheless, there
are some interesting results. The most striking result is that at age 62 the eﬀect has the
wrong sign and is not diﬀerent from zero. The reason for this is that most workers who
retire prior to age 62 claim as soon as possible, irrespective of Social Security incentives.
At later ages, when those who claim as soon as possible are not in the sample anymore,
the marginal eﬀects of the accruals tend to be bigger than for the working sample. At 63,
for example, the estimated coeﬃcient is 0.63 − 0.99 = −0.36 for a retired person, while
it is only −1.22−1.09 = −0.13 for a working person. Few retired workers claim after 63,
which translates into large standard errors at later ages.
The diﬀerence between high school graduates and college graduates is now even larger
when compared to the diﬀerence for the working sample. Another diﬀerence between
the working sample and the retired sample is related to the diﬀerential eﬀects by marital
status. While workers with a dependent spouse used to be less responsive to the accrual,
among those who already retired the eﬀect for singles and for those with an independent
spouse is larger. For the retired sample, there is no variation in accruals due to current
earnings, and since we control for the SSW and the AIME, the only variation that is left is
due to changes over time in the actuarial adjustments, changes in the normal retirement
age, and changes in the probabilities of survival. Although we control for the age diﬀerence
between husband and wife, the probabilities of survival generate a considerable variation
in the accruals, though only for workers with a dependent spouse. This may explain why
retired workers who are either single or have an independent spouse show eﬀects that are
large and with the wrong sign.
446 Conclusions
There is empirical evidence that a worker’s retirement decision responds to forward-
looking retirement incentives. These incentives depend on current and future earnings,
and on retirement beneﬁts. Social Security beneﬁts, which represent the most important
source of retirement income, are a complicated function lifetime earnings. It is gener-
ally assumed that workers know their beneﬁts and are able to compute their retirement
incentives.
In order to understand whether this is a reasonable assumption we analyze workers’
knowledge. Contacting the SSA represents the single most important channel through
which workers learn about their future beneﬁts. We model the probability of contacting
the SSA and ﬁnd evidence that is consistent with the existence of considerable costs of
collecting (and processing) information about Social Security beneﬁts: Workers who, for
various reasons (health, liquidity, etc.), face simple retirement decisions are less likely to
contact the SSA. Additional evidence conﬁrming this result comes from the 1995 introduc-
tion of the Social Security Statements. These Statements, which contain an estimate of
the worker’s beneﬁts if he retires at age 62, 65, and 70, generate an exogenous variation in
the cost of obtaining information. Upon receiving a Statement workers are more likely to
be able to provide a beneﬁt estimate and their beneﬁt estimate tends to be more precise.
Controlling for the endogeneity of the decision to contact the SSA, we ﬁnd that the whole
improvement is concentrated among those workers who don’t contact the SSA. We also
ﬁnd evidence of spillovers. Consistent with the importance of spouse beneﬁts for women,
female workers improve their knowledge when their husband receives a Statement, but
not viceversa.
Then we turn to study how this additional information aﬀects workers’ retirement be-
havior. Given that the Statement reduces the cost of information the model predicts that
workers who were at the margin of getting informed make better retirement decisions.
We measure optimality based on the correlation between the retirement decision and the
Social Security incentives. The empirical model is ﬂexible enough to allow us to measure
45the sensitivity to Social Security incentives for subgroups of workers. We ﬁnd that in the
pre-Statement period better-informed workers respond more strongly to Social Security
accruals. Although the introduction of the Statement doesn’t improve the overall respon-
siveness to the retirement incentives, there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity across age, marital
status, and race. Unpredictably, upon receiving a Statement black workers are more likely
to retire and claim as soon as possible. This has the eﬀect of lowering their responsiveness
to the retirement incentives. Compared to workers with a dependent spouse and workers
who are single, workers with a dependent spouse seem to become more likely to take their
spouse life–expectancy into account when computing their Social Security incentives.
Upon receiving a Statement workers who retire at the age of 62 or 65 become less
sensitive to Social Security incentives. This is puzzling and suggests that some workers
may follow simpler retirement rules and use 62 and 65 as focal points. This ﬁnding
has important implications for the construction of the Statement. Providing forecasted
beneﬁts at all 9 possible claiming ages may improve the decision making for workers
retiring at 62 and 65. Also, the Statement provides workers with information about
their beneﬁts, but it does not calculate a worker’s SSW. If this weakens the beneﬁcial
eﬀect of the Statement, a possible addition to the Statement could be a table that assists
workers in calculating their SSW. Since the SSA cannot possibly use individual–speciﬁc
mortality rates, one easy way to circumvent this problem would be to construct a table
that contains “suggested” retirement ages as a function of a worker’s own and his spouse’s
life–expectancy.
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50A Summary statistics
In Table 11, we report how these incentives have changed over time from 1984 to 2002 for
a 62-year-old male worker. Quite surprisingly, over the last 20 years, earnings of 62-year-
old male worker didn’t grow in real terms and were quite low during the early 1990s. The
AIME (expressed in yearly terms), on the other hand, has steadily increased over time,
suggesting that most of the real growth in earnings happened at younger ages. The SSW
is increasing over time as well. Starting in the mid–1990s, relative accruals and relative
peak values show an increase.
Table 11: Earnings and Social Security incentives at age 62
Year Earnings AIME Bt+1/Bt − 1 SSW ACC/SSW PV/SSW
1984 26.7 28.4 9.48% 181.1 2.89% 6.79%
1985 25.8 28.6 9.43 184.9 2.81 6.41
1986 25.8 29.5 9.39 191.6 2.79 6.29
1987 26.6 29.6 9.37 194.8 2.84 6.59
1988 24.8 29.7 9.43 195.0 2.83 6.51
1989 25.0 30.1 9.37 198.2 2.83 6.72
1990 25.6 30.7 9.34 200.1 2.77 6.32
1991 23.1 30.2 9.28 195.2 2.71 6.31
1992 22.9 31.3 9.20 200.6 2.67 6.17
1993 23.3 31.3 9.18 197.9 2.54 6.20
1994 22.4 31.8 9.12 203.7 2.54 6.26
1995 21.5 31.3 9.18 193.9 2.45 6.30
1996 22.4 32.9 9.19 205.7 2.59 6.74
1997 24.8 33.2 9.19 205.8 2.59 6.92
1998 24.3 35.4 9.12 215.6 2.54 6.74
1999 27.0 37.9 9.15 231.8 2.69 7.37
2000 26.6 36.9 9.32 223.1 2.72 7.28
2001 24.8 39.2 9.33 229.4 2.69 6.72
2002 24.1 39.6 9.46 227.9 2.80 6.92
Notes: Social security wealth (SSW), accruals (ACC) and peak values (PV) include
spouse’s beneﬁts. Values are in $1,000. Sample: SIPP linked to administrative data.
At age 62, there are two trends that neutralize each other. The ﬁrst trend, which
increases accruals and especially peak values, is due to the increase in life expectancy and
the increase in the delayed retirement credit (DRC), the actuarial increase beyond the
51normal retirement age.42 The DRC was 3 percent for the 1922–1924 birth cohorts, and
has been scheduled to reach 8 percent for workers born in 1943 or later cohorts (increasing
by 0.5 percentage points every two years). The other trend, the increase in the AIME,
tends to reduce the accruals. The reason is that the weight of current earnings in the
beneﬁt formula is decreasing over time. This can be seen by looking at the trend in the
growth rate of beneﬁts, and is especially pronounced among younger workers. Table 12
reports the Social Security incentives for a 55-year old worker. It is assumed that workers
who retire before age 62 claim as soon as they can, meaning at age 62. The expected
average growth rates of Social Security beneﬁts in 1995 are less than half of those in 1977.
Since mortality improvements are mostly concentrated at old ages, this reduction shows
up in the peak values as well. At age 55, the peak value has been decreasing over time,
and this may be responsible for some early withdrawals from the labor force.
42The increase in the DRC has an eﬀect on the PV when the peak lies beyond age 65, which with our
3 percent discount rate happens 25 percent of the time.
52Table 12: Earnings and Social Security incentives at age 55
Year Earnings AIME Bt+1/Bt − 1 SSW ACC/SSW PV/SSW
1977 35.6 23.8 3.48% 122.5 3.48% 23.34%
1978 34.8 23.8 3.42 124.6 3.42 22.56
1979 37.0 22.4 3.29 118.2 3.29 23.84
1980 35.4 21.4 3.39 115.0 3.39 23.68
1981 34.3 21.6 3.25 115.6 3.25 22.59
1982 34.2 22.1 3.00 119.3 3.00 22.13
1983 36.5 24.2 2.76 131.0 2.76 20.74
1984 36.7 24.0 2.64 127.3 2.64 20.94
1985 36.9 25.3 2.52 132.4 2.52 19.53
1986 36.7 26.3 2.08 135.7 2.08 17.58
1987 35.5 26.3 1.96 139.0 1.96 18.11
1988 36.0 26.4 1.87 135.5 1.87 17.99
1989 37.6 28.3 1.80 145.0 1.80 17.91
1990 35.7 28.1 1.71 141.5 1.71 17.22
1991 37.1 29.2 1.63 144.9 1.63 16.68
1992 37.5 30.5 1.49 152.7 1.49 16.67
1993 34.9 29.5 1.52 145.5 1.52 16.82
1994 36.7 31.6 1.42 151.2 1.42 15.61
1995 35.0 30.3 1.47 142.2 1.47 15.97
Notes: Social security wealth (SSW), accruals (ACC) and peak values (PV) include
spouse’s beneﬁts. Values are in $1,000. Sample: SIPP linked to administrative data.





Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
P(R=1) 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
ACC ($100k) 0.05 0.07 -0.16 0.26 0.01 0.04 -0.14 0.18
Forecasted earn.($100k) 0.40 0.23 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average ET tax 0.70 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Marginal ET tax 0.41 0.18 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SSW ($100k) 2.32 0.98 0.07 5.35 1.41 0.87 0.06 4.77
Spouse SSW ($100k) 0.34 0.55 0.00 2.46 0.32 0.51 0.00 2.53
AIME ($100k) 0.27 0.10 0.00 0.50 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.50
Prop. Wealth ($1m) 0.23 0.65 -7.50 8.00 0.22 0.63 -4.91 6.16
Health Insurance 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
Age diﬀerence -3.19 4.60 -30.00 10.00 -2.81 4.77 -30.00 10.00
SIPP panel 2 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
SIPP panel 3 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
SIPP panel 4 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
SIPP panel 5 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Children 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Year 1994 5.41 1984 2003 1994 5.28 1984 2003
Post–ET removal 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Post–Statement 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Black 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
Single 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Retired spouse 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Below high school 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
Some college 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
College 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00
Veteran 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00
Experience 38.56 7.48 9.00 52.00 26.45 9.31 9.00 48.00
Age 63.04 1.28 62.00 69.00 63.12 1.62 62.00 69.00
Independent spouse 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Pension 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Missing pen. Info 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
54Figure 4: The Social Security Statement
2
Your Estimated Benefits ￿ To  qual i f y  f or   benef i t s ,   you  ear n  “ cr edi t s ”   t hr ough  your  
wor k— up  t o  f our   each  year .   Thi s   year ,   f or   exam pl e,   you 
ear n  one  cr edi t   f or   each  $900  of   wages   or   s el f - em pl oym ent  
i ncom e.   W hen  you’ ve  ear ned  $3, 600,   you’ ve  ear ned  your  
f our   cr edi t s   f or   t he  year .   Mos t   peopl e  need  40  cr edi t s ,  
ear ned  over   t hei r   wor ki ng  l i f et i m e,   t o  r ecei ve  r et i r em ent  
benef i t s .   For   di s abi l i t y  and  s ur vi vor s   benef i t s ,   young  peopl e 
need  f ewer   cr edi t s   t o  be  el i gi bl e.
W e  checked  your   r ecor ds   t o  s ee  whet her   you  have  ear ned 
enough  cr edi t s   t o  qual i f y  f or   benef i t s .   I f   you  haven’ t   ear ned 
enough  yet   t o  qual i f y  f or   any  t ype  of   benef i t ,   we  can’ tgi ve 
you  a  benef i t   es t i m at e  now.   I f   you  cont i nue  t o  wor k,   we’ l l  
gi ve  you  an  es t i m at e  when  you  do  qual i f y .
What we assumed— I f   you  have  enough  wor k  cr edi t s ,  
wees t i m at ed  your   benef i t   am ount s   us i ng  your   aver age 
ear ni ngs   over   your   wor ki ng  l i f et i m e.   For   2004  and  l at er  
( upt o  r et i r em ent   age) ,   we  as s um ed  you’ l l   cont i nue  t o  wor k 
and  m ake  about   t he  s am e  as   you  di d  i n  2002  or   2003.  
W eal s o  i ncl uded  cr edi t s   we  as s um ed  you  ear ned  l as t   year  
and  t hi s   year .  
W e  can’ t   pr ovi de  your   act ual   benef i t   am ount   unt i l   you 
appl y  f or   benef i t s .   And that amount may differ from the 
estimates stated below because:  
(1) Your earnings may increase or decrease in the future.
( 2) Your   es t i m at ed  benef i t s   ar e  bas ed  on  cur r ent   l aw.  
Thelaw governing benefit amounts may change.*
( 3) Your   benef i t   am ount   m ay  be  af f ect ed  by  military 
service, railroad employment or pensions earned 
through work on which you did not pay Social Security 
tax. Visit www.socialsecurity.gov/mystatement to 
seewhether your Social Security benefit amount will 
beaffected.
Gener al l y ,   es t i m at es   f or   ol der   wor ker s   ar e  m or e 
accur at et han  t hos e  f or   younger   wor ker s   becaus e  t hey’ r e 
bas ed  on  a  l onger   ear ni ngs   hi s t or y  wi t h  f ewer   uncer t ai nt i es  
s uch  as   ear ni ngs   f l uct uat i ons   and  f ut ur e  l aw  changes .
Thes e  es t i m at es   ar e  i n  t oday’ s   dol l ar s .   Af t er   you 
s t ar tr ecei vi ng  benef i t s ,   t hey  wi l l   be  adj us t ed  f or   cos t - of -
l i vi ngi ncr eas es .
￿ *Retirement You  have  ear ned  enough  cr edi t s   t o  qual i f y  f or   benef i t s .   At   your   cur r ent   ear ni ngs   r at e,  
i f   you  s t op  wor ki ng  and  s t ar t   r ecei vi ng  benef i t s …
At   age  62,   your   paym ent   woul d  be  about … $882  a  m ont h
I f   you  cont i nue  wor ki ng  unt i l . . .
      your   f ul l   r et i r em ent   age  ( 67  year s ) ,   your   paym ent   woul d  be  about … $1, 278  a  m ont h
      age  70,   your   paym ent   woul d  be  about … $1, 594  a  m ont h
￿ *Disability You  have  ear ned  enough  cr edi t s   t o  qual i f y  f or   benef i t s .   I f   you  becam e  di s abl ed  r i ght   now,
Your   paym ent   woul d  be  about … $1, 169  a  m ont h
￿ *Family I f   you  get   r et i r em ent   or   di s abi l i t y  benef i t s ,   your   s pous e  and  chi l dr en  al s o  m ay  qual i f y  f or  
benef i t s .
￿ *Survivors You  have  ear ned  enough  cr edi t s   f or   your   f am i l y  t o  r ecei ve  s ur vi vor s   benef i t s .   I f   you  di e  t hi s  
year ,   cer t ai n  m em ber s   of   your   f am i l y  may  qual i f y  f or   t he  f ol l owi ng  benef i t s .  
Your   chi l d… $911  a  m ont h
Your   s pous e  who  i s   car i ng  f or   your   chi l d… $911  a  m ont h
Your   s pous e,   i f   benef i t s   s t ar t   at   f ul l   r et i r em ent   age… $1, 215  a  m ont h
Tot al   f am i l y  benef i t s   cannot   be  m or e  t han… $2, 233  a  m ont h
Your   s pous e  or   m i nor   chi l d  m ay  be  el i gi bl e  f or   a  s peci al   one- t i m e  deat h  benef i t   of   $255.
￿ Medicare You  have  enough  cr edi t s   t o  qual i f y  f or   Medi car e  at   age  65.   Even  i f   you  do  not   r et i r e  at   age  65,   be 
s ur e  t o  cont act   Soci al   Secur i t y  t hr ee  m ont hs   bef or e  your   65t h  bi r t hday  t o  enr ol l   i n  Medi car e.
We based your benefit estimates on these facts:
Your   nam e. . . Wanda  Wor ker
Your   dat e  of   bi r t h. . . May  5,   1963
Your   es t i m at ed  t axabl e  ear ni ngs
per   year   af t er   2003. . .   $35, 051
Your   Soci al   Secur i t y  num ber   ( onl y  t he  l as t   four digits
are shown to help prevent identity theft)... XXX-XX-2004
*Your estimated benefits are based on current law. Congress has made changes to the law in the past and can do so at 
any time. The law governing benefit amounts may change because, by 2042, the payroll taxes collected will be 
enough to pay only about 73 percent of scheduled benefits.
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Help Us Keep Your Earnings Record Accurate ￿
Total Social Security and Medicare taxes paid over your working career through the last year reported on the chart above:
Es t i m at ed  t axes   pai d  f or   Soci al   Secur i t y: Es t i m at ed  t axes   pai d  f or   Medi car e:
You  pai d: $24, 723 You  pai d: $5, 820
Your   em pl oyer s   pai d:   $24, 723 Your   em pl oyer s   pai d: $5, 820
Note:  You currently pay 6.2 percent of your salary, up to $87,900, in Social Security taxes and 1.45 percent in Medicare taxes 
on your entire salary. Your employer also pays 6.2 percent in Social Security taxes and 1.45 percent in Medicare taxes for you. 
If you are self-employed, you pay the combined employee and employer amount of 12.4 percent in Social Security taxes and 
2.9 percent in Medicare taxes on your net earnings.
Your Earnings Record at a Glance
Year s   You
W or ked
Your   Taxed
Soci al   Secur i t y
Ear ni ngs




1980 1, 123 1, 123
1981 1, 983 1, 983
1982 3, 293 3, 293
1983 4, 461 4, 461
1984 5, 600 5, 600
1985 6, 950 6, 950
1986 8, 813 8, 813
1987 10, 941 10, 941
1988 12, 803 12, 803
1989 14, 520 14, 520
1990 16, 308 16, 308
1991 17, 920 17, 920
1992 19, 655 19, 655
1993 20, 534 20, 534
1994 21, 730 21, 730
1995 23, 155 23, 155
1996 24, 838 24, 838
1997 26, 806 26, 806
1998 28, 720 28, 720
1999 30, 824 30, 824
2000 33, 060 33, 060
2001 34, 237 34, 237
2002 35, 051 35, 051
2003 Not   yet   r ecor ded
Did you know… Social Security is more than 
just a retirement program? It’s here to help you 
when you need it most.
You  and  your   f am i l y  m ay  be  el i gi bl e  f or   val uabl e 
benef i t s :
￿ W hen  you  di e,   your   f am i l y  m ay  be  el i gi bl e  t o 
r ecei ve  s ur vi vor s   benef i t s .
￿ Soci al   Secur i t y  m ay  hel p  you  i f   you  becom e
di s abl ed— even  at   a  young  age.  
￿ I t   i s   pos s i bl e  f or   a  young  per s on  who  has  
wor ked  and  pai d  Soci al   Secur i t y  t axes   i n  as  
f ew  as   t wo  year s   t o  becom e  el i gi bl e  f or  
di s abi l i t ybenef i t s .
Soci al   Secur i t y  cr edi t s   you  ear n  m ove  wi t h  you 
f r om   j ob  t o  j ob  t hr oughout   your   car eer .
You,   your   em pl oyer   and  Soci al   Secur i t y  s har e 
r es pons i bi l i t y  f or   t he  accur acy  of   your   ear ni ngs   r ecor d.
Si nce  you  beganwor ki ng,   we  r ecor ded  your   r epor t ed 
ear ni ngs   under   your   nam e  and  Soci al   Secur i t y  num ber .   W e 
have  updat ed  your   r ecor d  each  t i m e  your   em pl oyer   ( or  
you,   i f   you’ r e  s el f - em pl oyed)   r epor t ed  your   ear ni ngs .
Rem em ber ,   i t ’ s   your   ear ni ngs ,   not   t he  am ount   of   t axes  
you  pai d  or   t he  num ber   of   cr edi t s   you’ ve  ear ned,   t hat  
det er m i ne  your   benef i t   am ount .   W hen  we  f i gur e  t hat  
am ount ,   we  bas e  i ton  your   aver age  ear ni ngs   over   your  
l i f et i m e.   I f   our   r ecor ds   ar e  wr ong,   you  m ay  not   r ecei ve  al l  
t he  benef i t s   t o  whi ch  you’ r e  ent i t l ed.
￿ Review this chart carefully us i ng  your   own  r ecor ds   t o 
m ake  s ur e  our   i nf or m at i on  i s   cor r ect   and  t hat   we’ ve 
r ecor ded  each  year   you  wor ked.   You  ar e  t he  onl y 
per s onwho  can  l ook  at   t he  ear ni ngs   char t   and  know 
whet her   i ti scom pl et e  and  cor r ect .
Som e  or   al l   of   your   ear ni ngs   f r om   last year  m ay  not  
be  s hown  on  your   Statement.   I t   coul d  be  t hat   we  s t i l l  
wer e  pr oces s i ng  l as t   year ’ s   ear ni ngs   r epor t s   when  your  
Statement  was   pr epar ed.   Your   com pl et e  ear ni ngs   f or  
l as t   year   wi l l   be  s hown  on  next   year ’ s   Statement.Note:
I f   you  wor ked  f or   m or e  t han  one  em pl oyer   dur i ngany 
year ,   or   i f   you  had  bot h  ear ni ngs   and  s el f - em pl oym ent  
i ncom e,   we  com bi ned  your   ear ni ngs   f or   t he  year .
￿ There’s a limit on the amount of earnings on 
whichyou pay Social Security taxes each year.   The 
l i m i t   i ncr eas es   year l y .   Ear ni ngs   above  t he  l i m i t   wi l l  
not   appear   on  your   ear ni ngs   char t   as   Soci al   Secur i t y 
ear ni ngs .   ( For   Medi car e  t axes ,   t he  m axi m um   ear ni ngs  
am ountbegan  r i s i ng  i n  1991.   Si nce  1994,   all  of   your  
ear ni ngs   ar e  t axed  f or   Medi car e. )
￿ Call us right away  at1–800–772–1213  ( 7a. m . –7p. m .  
your   l ocal   t i m e)   i fany  ear ni ngs   f or   year s   before last 
year  ar e  s hown  i ncor r ect l y .   I f   pos s i bl e,   have  your   W- 2  or  
t ax  r et ur n  f or   t hos e  year s   avai l abl e.   ( I f   you  l i ve  out s i de  t he 
U. S. ,   f ol l ow  t he  di r ect i ons   at   t he  bot t om   of   page  4. )
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Some Facts About Social Security ￿
About Social Security and Medicare…
Soci al   Secur i t y  pays   r et i r em ent ,   di s abi l i t y ,   f am i l y  and 
s ur vi vor s   benef i t s .   Medi car e,   a  s epar at e  pr ogr am   r un  by 
t he  Cent er s   f or   Medi car e  and  Medi cai d  Ser vi ces ,   hel ps  
pay  f or   i npat i ent   hos pi t al   car e,   nur s i ng  car e,   doct or s ’  
f ees ,   and  ot her   m edi cal   s er vi ces   and  s uppl i es   t o  peopl e  age 
65  and  ol der ,   or   t o  peopl e  who  have  been  r ecei vi ng 
Soci alSecur i t y  di s abi l i t y  benef i t s   f or   t wo  year s   or   m or e.  
YourSoci al   Secur i t y  cover ed  ear ni ngs   qual i f y  you 
f orbot h  pr ogr am s .
  Here are some facts about Social Security’s benefits:
￿ Retirement— I f   you  wer e  bor n  bef or e  1938,   your  
f ul lr et i r em ent   age  i s   65.   Becaus e  of   a  1983  change 
i n t he  l aw,   t he  f ul l   r et i r em ent   age  wi l l   i ncr eas e 
gr adual l y  t o  67  f or   peopl e  bor n  i n  1960  and  l at er .  
Som e  peopl e  r et i r e  bef or e  t hei r   f ul l   r et i r em ent  
age.You  can  r et i r e  as   ear l y  as   age  62  and  t ake  your  
benef i t sat   a  r educed  r at e.   I f   you  cont i nue  wor ki ng 
af t er   your   f ul l   r et i r em ent   age,   you  can  r ecei ve  hi gher  
benef i t s   becaus e  of   addi t i onal   ear ni ngs   and  s peci al  
cr edi t s   f or   del ayed  r et i r em ent .
￿ Disability— I f   you  becom e  di s abl ed  bef or e  f ul l  
r et i r em entage,   you  can  r ecei ve  di s abi l i t y  benef i t s  
af t er   s i x  m ont hs   i f   you  have:
—   enough  cr edi t s   f r om   ear ni ngs   ( dependi ng  on 
your   age,   you  m us t   have  ear ned  s i x  t o  20  of   your  
cr edi t s   i n  t he  t hr ee  t o  10  year s   bef or e  you  becam e 
di s abl ed) ;   and
— a  phys i cal   or   m ent al   i m pai r m ent   t hat   i s   expect ed
t opr event   you  f r om   doi ng  “ s ubs t ant i al ”   wor k 
f ora  year   or   m or e,   or  r es ul t   i n  deat h.  
￿ Family— I f   you’ r e  el i gi bl e  f or   di s abi l i t y  or  
r et i r em entbenef i t s ,   your   cur r ent   or   di vor ced 
s pous e,   m i nor   chi l dr en,   or   adul t   chi l dr en  di s abl ed 
bef or e  age  22  al s o  m ay  r ecei ve  benef i t s .   Each  m ay 
qual i f y  f or   up  t o  about   50  per cent   of   your   benef i t  
am ount .   The  t ot al   am ount   depends   on  how  m any 
f am i l y  m em ber s   qual i f y .
￿ Survivors— W hen  you  di e,   cer t ai n  m em ber s   of  
yourf am i l y  m ay  be  el i gi bl e  f or   benef i t s :
—   your   s pous e  age  60  or   ol der   ( 50  or   ol der   i f  
di s abl ed,or   any  age  i f   car i ng  f or   your   chi l dr en 
younger   t han  age  16) ;   and
—   your   chi l dr en  i f   unm ar r i ed  and  younger   t han 
age18,   s t i l li n  s chool   and  younger   t han  19  year s   ol d,  
or   adul t   chi l dr en  di s abl ed  bef or e  age  22.
I f   you  ar e  di vor ced,   your   ex- s pous e  coul d  be 
el i gi bl ef or   a  wi dow’ s   or   wi dower ’ s   benef i t   on 
yourr ecor d  when  you  di e.
Receive benefits and still work...
You  can  cont i nue  t o  wor k  and  s t i l l   get   r et i r em ent   or  
s ur vi vor s   benef i t s .   I f   you’ r e  younger   t han  your   f ul l  
r et i r em entage,   t her e  ar e  l i m i t s   on  how  m uch  you  can  ear n 
wi t hout   af f ect i ng  your   benef i t   am ount .   The  l i m i t s  
change  each  year .   W hen  you  appl y  f or   benef i t s ,   we’ l l   t el l  
you  what   t he  l i m i t s   ar e  at   t hat   t i m e  and  whet her   wor k 
woul d  af f ect   your   m ont hl y  benef i t s .   W hen  you  r each  f ul l  
r et i r em ent   age,   t he  ear ni ngs   l i m i t s   no  l onger   appl y .
Before you decide to retire...
Thi nk  about   your   benef i t s   f or   t he  l ong  t er m .   Ever yone’ s  
s i t uat i on  i s   di f f er ent .   Forexam pl e,   be  s ur e  t o  cons i der  
t he  advant ages   and  di s advant agesof   ear l y  r et i r em ent .   I f  
you  choos e  t o  r ecei ve  benef i t s   bef or e  you  r each  f ul l  
r et i r em ent   age,   your   benef i t s   wi l l   be  per m anent l y 
r educed.   However ,   you’ l l   r ecei ve  benef i t s   f or   a  l onger  
per i od  of   t i m e.
To  hel p  you  deci de  when  i s   t he  bes t   t i m e  f or   you  t o 
r et i r e,   we  of f er   a  f r ee  bookl et ,   Social Security— 
Retirement Benefits  ( Publ i cat i on  No.   05- 10035) ,   t hat  
pr ovi dess peci f i c  i nf or m at i on  about   r et i r em ent .   You 
can  cal cul at e  f ut ur e  r et i r em ent   benef i t s   on  our   webs i t e 
atwww.socialsecurity.gov by  us i ng  t he  Social Security 
Benefit Calculators.   Ther e  ar e  ot her   f r ee  publ i cat i ons  
t hat   you  m ay  f i nd  hel pf ul ,i ncl udi ng:
￿ Understanding The Benefits  ( No.   05- 10024) — a 
gener alexpl anat i on  of   al l   Soci al   Secur i t y  benef i t s ;
￿ How Your Retirement Benefit Is Figured 
( No.   05- 10070) — an  expl anat i on  of   how  you 
cancal cul at e  your   benef i t ;
￿ The Windfall Elimination Provision ( No.   05- 10045) —
how  i t   af f ect s   your   r et i r em ent   or   di s abi l i t y  benef i t s ;  
￿ Government Pension Offset  ( No.   05- 10007) —
expl anat i onof   a  l aw  t hat   af f ect s   s pous e’ s   or  
wi dow( er ) ’ s   benef i t s ;   and
￿ When Someone Misuses Your Number ( No.   05- 10064) —
what   t o  do  i f   you’ r e  a  vi ct i m   of   i dent i t yt hef t .
W e  al s o  have  ot her   l eaf l et s   and  f act   s heet s   wi t h 
i nf or m at i onabout   s peci f i c  t opi cs   s uch  as   m i l i t ar y 
s er vi ce,s el f - em pl oym ent   or   f or ei gn  em pl oym ent .  
You can  r eques t   Soci al   Secur i t y  publ i cat i ons   at  
www.socialsecurity.gov  or   by  cal l i ng  us   at  
1–800–772–1213.
If you need more information—Vi s i t   www.socialsecurity.gov/mystatement  on  t he  I nt er net ,   cont act   any  Soci al   Secur i t y 
of f i ce,   cal l   1–800–772–1213  or   wr i t e  t o  Soci al   Secur i t y  Adm i ni s t r at i on,   Of f i ce  of   Ear ni ngs   Oper at i ons ,   P. O.   Box  33026,  
Bal t i m or e,   MD  21290- 3026.   I f   you’ r e  deaf   or   har d  of   hear i ng,   cal l   TTY  1–800–325–0778.   I f   you  have  ques t i ons   about  
your   per s onal   i nf or m at i on,   you  m us t   pr ovi de  your   com pl et e  Soci al   Secur i t y  num ber .   I f   your   addr es s   i s   i ncor r ect   on  t hi s  
Statement,   as k  t he  I nt er nal   Revenue  Ser vi ce  t o  s end  you  a  For m   8822.   We  don’ t   keep  your   addr es s   i f   you’ r e  not  
r ecei vi ng  Soci al   Secur i t y  benef i t s .
Para solicitar una Declaración en español, llame al 1-800-772-1213.
For m   SSA-7005  - SM- SI   ( 01/ 04)
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